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The Emergence of the Syrian Conflict and Exit Strategies 
Zouha Shaheen 
ABSTRACT 
What are the main drivers for the Syrian conflict and how can they be mitigated? This 
thesis assesses two different explanatory propositions. The first attributes to the conflict 
domestic sectarian and communitarian contentions, amid rising Sunni-Alawi power 
imbalance. The second blames growing socio-economic disparities between different 
regions and groups. Both views suggest that international factors have helped incite 
domestic strife. The thesis examines both views and highlights an alternative interpretation 
rooted in globalization theory and the double movement, as being responsible for the 
deterioration of state power and the incubation of socio-economic and communitarian 
grievances. The study explores various conflict mitigation models and assesses their 
abilities to provide satisfactory exit strategy to current impasse. It highlights the 
prominence of international players in any future reconciliation.  
 
Keywords: Syria, conflict, Arab, Spring, Middle East, Democracy, Causes, Consociational, 
sectarianism. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1-Introduction 
It was the day of March 15, 2011 when it all began; the day that set the stage for an 
ongoing Syrian war that destroyed cities and caused massive civilian casualties. Until this 
day, no accurate number of casualties of the Syrian conflict is documented. However, 
according to the United Nations and Arab League envoy to Syria Staffan De Mistura, the 
damage is estimated to be more than 400,000 lives. More than 4 million people had to flee 
the country while another almost 8 million are internally displaced, in what is deemed the 
largest refugee and displacement crisis of our time. The protracted conflict in Syria has set 
development back by decades, with no end in sight and no prospects of resolution 
happening in the near future. Nevertheless, Syria has turned into a playground for a war by 
proxy between different powers. The situation on the ground is getting more complicated 
with time due to the increasing numbers of fighting factions. Statistics indicate that the 
Syrian crisis is the world’s largest humanitarian crisis since World War 2. What had begun 
as peaceful protests rapidly metamorphosed into an armed fight that escalated into a full 
scale civil war -that - drew in regional and world powers. The degree of violence escalated 
and led to the emergence of terrorist groups such as AL Nussra front and the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Syria became at the heart of the news, holding the attention of 
media outlets all over the world. The Syrian crisis spillover on neighboring countries was 
tremendous; over two million Syrian refugees were registered in Turkey, over a million in 
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Lebanon and huge numbers scattered around the world, especially in Europe. Together 
with the pressure imposed by the refugee crisis on relevant countries, Syria’s strategic 
geographical location in the region made it one of the most important issues holding the 
attention of the whole world.   
This paper examines the causes of the Syrian conflict and seeks to explore possible 
solutions to the protracted crisis. As mentioned above, the Syrian crisis is the world’s 
largest humanitarian crisis since World War 2. Thus, uncovering its motives might be the 
first step in overcoming these reasons and ending the bloody war that tore Syria apart. Why 
is it that what started out as an Arab spring turned out to be a bloody one for Syria? 
1.2-Literature Review 
 A substantial amount of research on Syria in general has been conducted throughout 
the years. Syria was considered one of the most influential states in the Arab region and 
thus studying Syria throughout history was of interest to many scholars. After 2011, 
scholars began to analyze the situation in Syria and explore possible scenarios to end the 
war. Scholars argued about the reasons that led to the emergence of the Syrian uprisings; 
their studies varied from primordial sectarianism to socio-political reforms during Bashar 
Al Assad’s term and the impact of regional and international actors.  As Reese Erlich states, 
many claimed that Syria is going into sectarian war between the ruling Alawite minority 
and Sunni groups.  While in reality, Syrians had lived in harmony through the forty one 
year- rule of former president Hafez Al Assad and the current president Bashar Al Assad. 
After the crisis began, each minority swaddled itself in order to protect its members and 
interests. While minorities such as Alawites, Christians and Druze gathered around the 
regime, the majority of Sunnis– specifically the extremely religious fraction that did not 
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benefit from the regime- gathered around Islamic movements trying to topple down the 
regime (Erlich, 2014). On the other hand, Carpenter emphasizes the ancient rivalry between 
Shiite and Sunni dominance. He affirms that the rebellion that took place in 2011 was an 
attempt by a Sunni majority to take down the “coalition of minorities” regime (Carpenter, 
Tangeled Web: The Syrian Civil WAr and Its Implications, 2013). While Erlich and 
Carpenter disagreed on whether sectarianism had been primordial or had been used as a 
means to achieve a common goal, some scholars dated the causes decades before the 
emergence of the conflict, such as McHugo. The latter blamed the patronage system of the 
Baathists which focused on rewarding those who are loyal while neglecting others. This in 
a way led to the emergence of a class conflict inside Syria and eventually sectarian conflict. 
(McHugo, 2014). In addition, some scholars such as Rotberg and Kaplan discuss how Syria 
turned from a rogue state to a failed one. They believe that the strategies used by Al-Assad 
regime throughout the family’s rule were the real reason behind the emergence of the 
rebellion. These strategies, including abusing power, manipulating the political arena, 
focusing on one sect –Alawite- , while hindering any attempt to build an open democratic 
system that consists of representatives of the entire population, together with corruption, 
eventually led to a political and social malfunction which caused the people to revolt. They 
believe that Syria was too rogue of a state to even survive such an uprising, but the coercive 
military power used by the regime prevented the success of the revolution (Rotberg & 
Kaplan, 2014). 
 On the other hand, Deeb stated other reasons behind the Syrian crisis. First, he 
found that the degree of reforms that President Bashar Al-Assad made was considerably 
acceptable considering the time he had. However, opposition groups being greedy and 
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manipulated by others, did not accept any of his reforms- even though at some point they 
met the requirements set by these groups.  He believes that the Syrian crisis has many 
causes including:(1) a systematic diplomatic war against Syria as a result of its Arab 
nationalism defense status and its rejection of Western imperialism, (2) a rivalry between 
the Baathists and the Muslim Brotherhood movement which seized the opportunity to re- 
surface after the Arab Spring and aimed to tear apart the homogenous social fabric of Syria. 
It is important to note here that Syria consists of Sunnis as a majority, then come the 
minorities Alawites, Christians, Druz and Kurds respectively. Deeb believes that this 
diversity in Syria was successfully managed by the Baath regime. However, manipulating 
the minds of people through religion was a tool to break this homogenous fabric and thus 
control people more easily. (3) Media channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia played a 
major role in intensifying the situation by hosting religious figures such as Al-Karadawi to 
tell people that it is their sacred duty to rebel against the regime. Deeb believes that there 
are many other reasons and instruments that were used to weaken Syria after it was heading 
into a golden era (Deeb, 2013) . 
On the other hand, could the conflict in Syria be an example of a civilizational one? 
According to Huntington, most of the clashes that will occur in the post-cold war period 
will probably be civilizational conflicts. He believes that Arabs are more attached to their 
religion than to their nation and that the Arab culture does not accept liberal ideology and 
pluralism. He also finds that the world is separated by different cultures and civilizations 
and that at some point, these cultural differences will eventually clash. However, looking 
at  the events that have taken place over the past five years and the wave of democracy that 
swept over the Middle East, we see that the Arab people demanded democracy and liberal 
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reforms and not an Islamic state as foreseen by Huntington . When it comes to Syria, the 
conflict does not seem to be a cultural one; it emerged among people with the same cultural 
identity. Apparently, Arab people didn’t only demanded for their rights, they also rebelled 
against their Muslim leaders and conflicts were risen among people with the same cultural 
background. The conflict in Syria was not a clash between the Western ideology and the 
Syrian one; it was a clash between the Syrian people and their regime (Brooks, 2011). On 
the other hand, the spread of extremist thought in the world may be explained through 
Huntington’s theory. Extremist Muslim thought manifested as   a rejection of Western ideas 
that were spreading across the Middle East. For example, Al Qaeda and ISIS both reject 
Western ideas of liberalism and modernization and strive to build an Islamic nation. 
To proceed, Kashefi agrees with Brooks and emphasizes the relation between 
Huntington’s views of the clash of civilizations and the current Arab Uprisings. He affirms 
that the clash of civilizations according to Huntington is based on the cultural identity, 
asking the question ‘who am I?’ and that most of the time identity is related and based on 
religious perception. On the other hand, Kashefi’s explanation of the uprisings was not a 
matter of a cultural identity and an Islamic driven revolution rather than claiming freedom, 
democracy, human dignity and human rights. People who revolted were mostly revolting 
against their Islamic leader.  Kashefi further recognizes the socio-economic situation of the 
region as a reason behind the uprisings. High unemployment rates as well as inequality in 
the distribution of economical wealth were major forces moving the youth to revolt 
(Kashefi, 2013). 
On another front, Salamey highlights the consequences of the emerging 
globalization’s double movement on the situation in the Middle East. The double 
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movement theory mainly describes the changes in the global market forces and global 
politics that will eventually lead to a clash with the rising nationalist movements. In other 
words, the rise of globalization, interconnected economies and transcending ideologies all 
over the world, was marked as a reason for the deteriorating role of centralized national 
economies. This expansion of the global economy does not only affect the state’s economic 
policies but also its political strategies;  it weakens the nationalist state’s control over the 
state’s economy. The weakening of the state’s central power and hegemony over its people 
combined with exposing its national economy and the declining role of nationalism, led to 
a rising role of communitarianism. Consequently, sectarianism -which is a part of 
communitarianism- was a substitute for the deteriorating role of the state and a mean for 
each sect to preserve its interests economically and culturally. The economic exposure, the 
weakening of nationalists and the rise of communitarian groups were all aspects of the 
globalization’s double movement that took over the region. As a result, the shift in the 
Middle East and the region as a whole and the rise of communitarian groups need new 
governing arrangements in order to bring stability to the region (Salamey, 2015). 
 Along with Salamey, Geneive Abdo asserts that the rise of the sectarian sentiment 
in the Middle East is the result of authoritarian regimes losing power and control over their 
states. Following this line of thought, sectarianism had always existed in the Middle East 
states but was somehow contained by the strategies pursued by these regimes. However, 
once these regimes were shaken, sectarianism was the rational replacement of the state’s 
lack of control. (Abdo, 2013) 
The importance of regional power politics is also crucial concerning the Syrian 
case. Regional power balance that was manifested by regional actors involved in the Syrian 
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conflict, intensified the ethno-sectarian sentiment of the Syrian conflict. Due to the inability 
of either the Syrian regime or the opposition to win the conflict, the reliance on external 
factors became essential to the survival for both of them. Therefore, many regional trends 
helped in shaping the current situation of the Syrian conflict. These trends are: the rise of 
Iran as a regional power and its extension in the region through Hezbollah as well as the 
growing relationship between Iran, Hezbollah and the Syrian regime. Another is the rise of 
Turkey as a moderate Islamic regional power and its support for the Syrian opposition. The 
third trend is the shift in the power balance towards the Islamic Sunni Monarchies such as 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Consequently, these trends contributed to shaping sectarian 
alliances throughout the Middle East, especially after year 2000.  Furthermore, as ethno-
sectarian alliances keep defining the sentiment of regional politics, fragmentation and 
polarization are more likely to shape upcoming events. Accordingly, the future of the 
Syrian conflict is not in the hands of Syrians only; the impact of regional politics and 
interventionists will have a decisive role in determining Syria’s future. (Heydemann, 2013) 
 Another scholar, Carpenter, refers to the Syrian crisis as a “complex and murky” 
conflict rather than a simple one only aiming to overthrow Bashar Al-Assad. Complexity 
is increasing in Syria due to many factors, as Carpenter states. The rise of Islamists and the 
regional context of the Sunni-Shiite old rivalry are both contributing factors that complicate 
the Syrian conflict. Since Saudi Arabia lost control over the Iraqi regime and the 
subsequently increasing influence of Iran over Iraq, it is not a coincidence that Saudi Arabia 
is supporting the Syrian opposition trying to topple down Al-Assad’s regime, in order to 
reverse Iran’s growing influence in the region. Turkey also emerged as a key player in the 
Syrian conflict; it was mainly a religious ideology that led to Erdogan’s support for the 
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Sunni camp in Syria (Carpenter, Tangled Web : The Syrian Civil War and Its Implications, 
2013). 
The role of international actors has also been key in complicating the conflict in 
Syria; the western coalition led by the United States versus Russia and China. The two 
different ideologies only intensified the situation rather than solving it. While the United 
States affirms on the humanitarian principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), urging the 
international community to intervene in order to protect civilians, Russia and china on the 
other hand, emphasize the principle of state sovereignty and view the U.S’ ambitions as a 
political play to achieve global hegemony. (Carpenter, Tangled Web : The Syrian Civil 
War and Its Implications, 2013)  
Hinnebush and Zintl summarize much of what was said before. First, the socio-
economic factor was a major cause contributing to the class conflict in Syria. The socio-
economic reforms made since Bashar AL Assad came into power exposed the improper 
infrastructure for such reforms as well as the inconsistency in economic reform policies. 
Furthermore, , while sectarianism existed in Syria and hatred towards the “coalition of 
minority regime” was repeatedly expressed, it was successfully managed by the security 
apparatus of the regime and the secular Ba’athist rule of Syria through their Arab 
nationalism ideology that marginalized religious identities and created a shared national 
identity despite religious and sectarian differences. However, with the decreasing role of 
the Arab nationalist ideology, these differences resurfaced again, supported by regional 
actors, allowing both the Syrian regime and the opposition to use sectarianism as a tool to 
manipulate masses. The Syrian regime consistently highlighted the urgent need of its 
survival in order to protect minorities, while extremists seized the opportunity of the 
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insurgencies and aimed to claim power in Syria. While the conflict became increasingly 
militarized, there was no place for soft liners to seek political settlement and thus the 
conflict kept spiraling out of control. 
 As the war escalated, international and regional players only continued to intensify 
complexity of the situation. The old U.S-Russian cold war is revived in Syria through a 
proxy war; the Irani- Hezbollah camp also aimed to counterbalance the Saudi-Qatari camp. 
It is important to note here the role of Turkey in supporting opposition groups and 
harboring the so called “enemies of the Syrian state”. (Hinnebush & Zintl, 2015) 
 To summarize, since the beginning of the Syrian crisis scholars tried to explore the 
reasons of its emergence. Some say that it is primordial sectarianism while others disagree.  
Some refer to the socio-economic factors while conspiracy theorists believe that it is a 
thorough plan to destroy the axis of resistance. Due to the short timeline of the Syrian crisis 
and its fluid nature, the amount of literature is relatively small. In other words, five years 
is not a sufficient timeframe for scholars to gather and identify all the potential reasons that 
caused the emergence and escalation of the crisis. This thesis demonstrates and analyzes 
the direct and indirect reasons in the wake of the crisis and illustrates the possible scenarios 
that could be implemented in order to stop the Syrian war.  
1.3-Research Questions 
 Defining the main reasons of the Syrian conflict is the major purpose of this 
research. Is the conflict communally driven by differences over power sharing or is it 
instigated by other institutional or international contentions? Some scholars such as 
Carpenter claim that it is sectarian since the beginning while others such as Heydemann 
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refuse the sense of sectarianism. Heydemann emphasizes the role of regionalization and 
the sectarianism of regional politics, rather than the Syrian people –most of whom have 
preserved their national identity as Syrians and are not bound by any sectarian divisions. 
Regarding exit strategies, the complexity of the Syrian conflict needs a deep 
examination of the conflict and its origins in order to find suitable solutions that could end 
the war. Which political arrangement could be the most effective formula regarding the 
Syrian situation? Could consociational democracy be a solution for the Syrian civil war if 
the conflict was indeed a communitarian-based conflict? Or would it only deepen the 
existing sectarian cleavages and remove any sense of Syrian national identity?    
 According to Lijphat, consociational democracy is a very useful technique and 
political model for deeply divided societies. Consociational democracy is a political 
formula where all the subcultures are represented and governed by an elite cartel. Its 
purpose is to turn a fragmented society into a stable democracy. Lijphart defines four 
characteristics in which consociational democracy could be implemented. The first is the 
establishment or existence of a grand coalition where all parties are represented. Second, 
the veto power that can be used by one segment in order to topple any decision that could 
harm its interests. The third is proportionality, which means each segment is to be 
represented in the coalition in accordance with its proportion of the society. The fourth is 
segmental autonomy which emphasizes the importance of each segment to have a certain 
amount of autonomy in its jurisdiction. In accordance with these four characteristics, 
certain aspects are also preferred to exist in a society such as the existence of an elite cartel 
that rules the subcultures and a relatively small-size d country in which each segment is 
respectively located in one geographical area (Lijphart, 1969). After examining the main 
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characteristics of consociational democracy and its implications on the ground, it is 
necessary to examine its effectiveness as a solution to Syria’s conflict. Is it possible for 
Syria to implement such a political formula to stop the war? This question will be taken 
into consideration when researching possible resolution mechanisms for the Syrian 
conflict.  
Furthermore, with the involvement of foreign actors, to what extent are regional 
and international actors willing to compromise in order to end the war and its spillover? If 
what is happening in Syria now is a balance of power war by proxy, would it be sufficient 
for regional and international powers to agree on negotiations and start the process of state 
reconciliation?  
When it comes to the existence of armed groups in Syria, could these groups be 
integrated in the Syrian civil society? If Syrians have the chance of being integrated, then 
what is the fate of terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al -Nussra front? What is the role of 
external factors in the battle against terrorism in Syria? 
1.4-Methodology 
 A qualitative approach is used to identify and analyze the causes of the Syrian crisis. 
Collecting and investigating secondary data will be the primary source for this research. 
This thesis will illustrate the given literature to analyze the causes of the Syrian conflict 
and find suitable exit strategies regarding the causes.  Consequently, case studies are used 
in order to provide a comprehensive view and supporting evidences to the literature. These 
studies are rich with information that could be missing from the limited available literature.  
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These same approaches are used in order to identify potential solutions and scenarios 
regarding the Syrian crisis. 
 Comparative studies are used to identify possible scenarios that were implemented 
in other countries, mainly focusing on Lebanon and Syria. By comparing these two 
countries, the consociational democracy model that took place in Lebanon is examined as 
an effective model to be implemented in Syria. Consequently, if consociationalism cannot 
be the solution nor an effective strategy to be applied then what could be the alternative? 
1.5-Map of Thesis 
 After reviewing available literature and gathering all relevant information, it is 
expected that the analysis answers the given questions and suggest suitable solutions for 
the conflict. This thesis is divided into five chapters, the second chapter describes the 
emergence of the conflict and provides a deep insight of how it transformed from mass 
protests into an armed confrontation among all parties. It enlists the theoretical 
interpretations of the causes of the Syrian conflict. The third chapter focuses mainly on 
analyzing the given theoretical interpretations and compare them in light of political 
developments over the past five years. It illustrates the regional and international drives 
that intensified the Syrian conflict. The fourth chapter identifies possible solutions and 
examines the different propositions being advanced for political transition and settlements 
in Syria. This chapter focuses mainly on comparing between Lebanon and Syria as 
comparative case studies. It illustrates how a power-sharing formula and other secular 
models can help in forecasting the potential arrangements. Finally, the last chapter 
summarizes the argument of this thesis and provides a brief look on the findings. It 
demonstrates the opportunities and challenges that might affect the political settlement in 
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Syria and provides the reader with different scenarios and roadmaps that can help facilitate 
conflict mitigation, prepare the ground for a new Syria and start the process of state 
reconciliation.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Emergence of the Syrian Conflict: the Local 
Drives 
2.1-Introduction 
On July 10, 2000, Bashar Al-Assad was elected president succeeding his late father 
Hafez Al-Assad. Since his inauguration, there was much hope and optimism for this young 
educated president who is familiar with western ideology .When he married his wife Asma 
Al-Assad,  A Sunni from a well-known family in Homs, the couple portrayed an image of 
a modern young couple promising a prospering future for Syria. Furthermore, Assad was 
welcomed by most of the leaders of great powers such as the United States, France and 
most European countries. Since his inaugural ceremony, Assad promised to modernize 
Syria and put in action a series of political and economic reforms. People were largely 
satisfied and Syria started to develop economically due to the economical reformation of 
Al- Assad. (Starr 2015) 
However, Assad’s first years were not as simple as they seemed to be. In 2001, a 
group of Syrian opposition intellectuals formed the “Damascus spring”. Their main 
demands were political reformations including the lifting of the emergency law, releasing 
political prisoners and establishing the right to form political parties. The movement started 
to have an impact among Syrians; they formed closed forums where they discussed 
political issues that were considered taboo by the Syrian regime. When AL Assad 
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eventually adhered to their demands, his top security chiefs warned him that they cannot 
ensure he stays in power if he keeps this pace of political reformation. At that point, the 
regime reacted with imprisonments and the closure of these forums with force. It was the 
end of Damascus spring. (McHugo 2014) 
It was two years later when the U.S -led invasion of Iraq began, posing a turning 
point in the Syrian history. The U.S-Syrian relations were not at their best between 2001 
and 2003. During that time, the United States declared its war on terror and strived to 
change the status quo in the Middle East, including the policies of the Syrian regime. These 
strategies were clear in Collin Powel’s visit to Damascus during the Iraqi invasion, when 
he stressed the need for President Assad to comply with U.S demands. These demands 
mainly focused on closing the offices of the Hamas movement in Damascus, ending any 
relationships with Khaled Mashaal and other Palestinian leaders in Damascus, as well as 
ending the relationship with and support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. It was clear that the 
United States was demanding Syria to shift its position from supporting the axis of 
resistance, towards peace with Israel and increased cooperation with the United States. 
Regardless of the enmity between Saddam and Assad, the latter recognized the risks 
accompanied with the American invasion of Iraq. Assad knew that the war in Iraq would 
only intensify the religious and sectarian division in the region causing a direct threat to 
the safety of Syria. (Erlich 2015). 
 It was a pivotal point in the Syrian history when Assad refused to comply with 
these demands; it was also the time when the decision was made to weaken Syria (Kleib 
2016). Furthermore, on December 12, 2003, President Bush signed the “Syria 
Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act”. This act stipulated the 
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withdrawal of all kinds of U.S investments in Syria and the blockage of all U.S exports to 
Syria. The act also denounced Syria as a state sponsoring terrorism and called for closing 
all terrorist offices such as Hamas’, ending ties with Hezbollah and Iran as well as the 
withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. This enmity toward the Syrian regime was a 
result of the Syrian stand against American ambitions in the region and the Syrian support 
to all kinds of resistance in Iraq in cooperation with Hezbollah (McHugo 2014). 
Furthermore , General Wesley Clark , a retired General of the U.S army, demonstrated that 
the decision  to invade Iraq was made without finding any connections between Saddam 
and Al-Qaeda and that the United States made the decision to take out seven countries in 
five years, including Syria. (Clark and Goodman 2016) 
 Hariri’s assassination marked a new era concerning the Syrian-Lebanese relations. 
On April 30, 2005, Syria declared the withdrawal of all its forces from Lebanon, under 
massive pressure from international and regional powers. A new chapter began between 
Lebanon and Syria where diplomatic relations were the master of the scene. (Pan 2005). 
However, even after the withdrawal and despite the demands by the U.S Assad 
strengthened his ties with Hezbollah and Iran, especially during the 2006 war between 
Israel and Hezbollah and the Gaza war.  
When it comes to the regional aspect, the Syrian Turkish relations were strong; 
Turkey mediated between Syria and Israel to facilitate the peace negotiations just before 
the Gaza war started. Economic and personal ties were established between Damascus and 
Ankara. The two countries signed more than 40 agreements concerning free trade and other 
economic developments. Turkey’s policy of zero problems with neighbors was successful 
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at that time (Zafar 2012). How turkey changed its policy from zero problems with 
neighbors to zero neighbors without problems will be explained at a later stage. 
Few years later the conflict began. It was the Arab Spring wave that swept over the 
Middle East and shaped the new Middle East. Just one year after it started in Tunisia, it 
had spread to Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, Egypt and Syria.  
2.2-Emergence of the Syrian Conflict 
It was March 15, 2011 when the protests started in the city of Dera’a. The protests 
broke out after the security forces arrested teenagers who wrote on their school walls 
freedom slogans. Protests began by claiming freedom, reformation and limiting the role of 
security forces.  Soon enough, these protests were repressed by security forces. People at 
that time were no longer controlled by fear. On the contrary, people continued protesting 
despite the massive repression methods pursued by the regime’s security forces (Starr 
2015). Clashes between the security forces and rebels began to take place in the southern 
city of Dera’a, the coastal city of Banias and the suburbs of Damascus. The regime 
deployed fractions of the Syrian army in order to repress any anti-regime movements. 
Syrians from both sides were killed. The opposition accused the regime of brutally killing 
peaceful protestors while the regime accused the armed opposition of killing soldiers and 
security forces. (Starr 2015). At a later stage, President Bashar Al-Assad made a series of 
reforms including lifting the state emergency law, dismissing the government and releasing 
many political prisoners. At that time, the opposition was no longer requesting reforms;  it 
was asking to topple down the regime and ending the forty one year- rule of Al-Assad 
family. Consequently, protests were spreading across the country reaching Hama and 
Homs.  Protestors were divided according to their ideologies. A group of them were non-
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sectarian believers who demanded national unity against the brutal acts of the regime and 
repeatedly announced their famous slogan “peacefully protesting, no difference between 
Muslims and Christians neither Sunni nor Alawite, we are all a national unity.”(Erlich, 
Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What The World Can Expect, 2014) 
.On the other hand, especially in Homs and Banias, the conflict was shaped by sectarian 
sentiment; protestors started to use the slogan “Christians to Beirut and Alawites to the 
coffin” (Deeb, Crisis in Syria, 2013). Soon enough, a military confrontation started to take 
place in many cities, declaring the beginning of the civil war in Syria. With a rapid pace, 
trained militant groups were spread across many cities fighting, the Syrian army and the 
Syrian security forces. These groups were mainly supported and armed by states such as 
Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United States.  As the conflict proceeded and increased 
in complexity, many regional and international players got involved. Each of these players 
had different intentions and significance. The two tables below clarify the main players 
involved in Syria and their main interests. 
Table 1.Main Armed Groups Fighting Inside Syria  
Groups 
 
Positions and Interests 
The Syrian army The official branch of the Syrian armed 
forces defending the regime.  
The Free Syrian army Consists primarily of soldiers and officers 
defected from the Syrian army. Its main 
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coordination is with the national coalition 
for Syrian revolutionary and opposition 
forces.  
Al Nussra Front A Group of extremist muslims aiming to 
establish an Islamic state in Syria where 
Islamic legislation is to be implemented. 
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ( 
ISIS ) 
It originated in Iraq and moved to Syria. 
ISIS seeks to establish the Islamic caliphate 
in Syria and Iraq. 
The Islamic army Coalition of minor militia groups mainly 
based in the suburbs of Damascus lead by 
Zahran Alloush (before his death in a joint 
airstrike by the Syrian and Russian air 
forces) 
 
Table 2. Regional and International Players Involved in the Conflict. 
Groups  Positions and Interests 
Hezbollah An armed Lebanese militia and a political 
party which was involved in the Syrian 
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conflict to defend the Syrian regime 
especially after Al Qusayr battle. 
Iran Iran’s involvement was to defend the 
Syrian regime. The Iranian national guards 
played a critical role in supporting the 
regime through their coordination with the 
Syrian army and Hezbollah. 
Russia  Russia was indirectly involved in Syria 
until the 15 of September, 2015. Before 
that, Russia provided the regime with 
intelligence information and army supplies. 
Since September 2015, Russia declared its 
commencement of airstrikes in Syria 
against ISIS. 
Kurds The Kurdish minority of Syria played a 
critical role concerning the northern 
borders of the country. Their primary 
interest is to defend their territories against 
ISIS and other militias. 
United States  The United States repeatedly urged Al-
Assad to step down. It supported the 
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opposition since the beginning of the 
conflict. The United States is also leading 
the international coalition that conducted 
airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq and Syria 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar Their main role was supporting the armed 
opposition with weapons and financial 
support. Their primary goal was to reverse 
the Shiite influence, led by Iran through its 
extension in the region “Hezbollah”.  
Turkey Turkey’s support for the Sunni opposition 
in Syria was based on its perspective and 
ideology of furthering political Islam 
movements, manifested through its 
positive reaction toward Egypt during the 
phase of the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkey 
constantly urged the international 
community to establish a no-fly zone in 
northern Syria and frequently supplied the 
opposition with money and weapons. 
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Stating all the parties involved in the Syrian conflict seems unfeasible. On the 
ground, clashes have been taking place among various armed groups. Each faction has its 
own ideology; there is no common goal or principle guiding these groups. While the Free 
Syrian Army’s aim was to topple down the repressive Assad regime and to establish a 
secular democratic state, extremist groups were seeking to create an Islamic caliphate. 
Combatants in Syria are not only Syrians; they have different nationalities and ideologies, 
including moderate secular Syrian combatants, Syrian jihadists and non-Syrian jihadists 
mainly from Chechnya, Pakistan and Europe. This diversity makes the situation even more 
complicated. If Syrian combatants might be reintegrated in any potential political 
arrangements, what could be the fate of non-Syrian combatants and jihadists (Manfreda)? 
 A proxy war has been taking place in Syria since the emergence of the conflict 
between the Shiite axis represented by Iran, Hezbollah and Syria against the Sunni camp, 
represented mainly by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. 
 Equally represented, the disagreement between the two major powers of the world, 
Russia and the United States, makes the situation even more immune to any resolution 
(McHugo, 2014)(Sayegh, 2014).To summarize, the geopolitics of the region, the regional 
balance of power, a proxy war and a full scale civil war are what draw the solid lines 
representing the Syrian conflict. 
Map1. Controlled Territories  in Syria. 
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Source: IUCA Database 
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2.3-Causes of the Syrian Conflict 
 Syria, or the beating heart of Arabism, was now drowning in a war that destroyed 
most of its cities and caused the death of hundreds of thousands of its people. Syria that 
once had a decisive role in the Arab region, has become a playground where all ancient 
rivalries among Arabs were revealed. What were the reasons behind this conflict? Was 
Bashar Al-Assad the reason for the emergence of this war or was he the savior that saved 
Syria from total destruction? Was it all planned from the beginning to destroy Syria or was 
it legitimate demands claiming democracy and freedom? 
 It is unfair to say that it was planned from the beginning while there were people 
who had legitimate claims for reforms. On the other hand, it is unfair to say that it is the 
security apparatus and acts of the regime that caused all deaths while hundreds of thousands 
of the military and other security men are being killed and tortured (Kleib 2016). The 
complexity of the Syrian conflict needs a deep examination of the reasons that caused the 
emergence of the conflict.  
2.3.1-Socio-Economical Factor 
 Economic reforms were among the priorities on the agenda of Assad’s rule. Soon 
enough after his inauguration, Assad revealed series of economic reforms, moving Syria 
from a closed economy into a social market economy. Indeed, the Syrian regime applied 
the Chinese model of economy regardless of genuine reformations regarding the political 
aspect. It appeared to be that the suburban areas were the most affected by liberalizing the 
economy. Consequently, these new reformations were mostly concentrated on major cities 
such as Damascus and Aleppo while other suburban areas were neglected. Indeed, at the 
beginning of the conflict, these suburbs were the earliest places to revolt (Kleib 2016). In 
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fact, committing economical reformations without a proper economic plan nor adequate 
institutional infrastructure led to an increase in the gap among all Syrian social classes. 
While the rich got richer, the middle and lower classes were striving to keep up the pace of 
such an open market, limiting the local production. Although the Syrian regime maintained 
the reform process, it ensured its role as a supervisor of such an open market in a way that 
could not affect the Syrian political system (Hinnebush and Zintl 2015). Without a doubt, 
the economy in Syria was controlled and constrained by the bureaucratic rules and 
malfunctioning of the Syrian state (Deeb 2013). On the other hand, crony capitalism was 
the dominant feature of the economic reforms. While private banks and insurance 
companies arrived to Syria, the closest inner circle of regime officials and relatives were 
the biggest beneficiaries from these investments. Such crony capitalism was manifested in 
Assad’s Cousin Rami Makhlouf. The latter was supposedly owning 60% of the Syrian 
economy through his companies (McHugo, Syria A Recent History 2014).As  a result, the 
Syrian economy was not able to move beyond  the surface, either because of the lack of 
proper infrastructure and institutions that were able to carry such transformation,  or 
because of the inner circle of the regime’s special interests (Hinnebush and Schmidt, The 
State And The Political Economy of Reform In Syria 2009). 
 Assad’s anticipation of a modernized liberal Syria was soon abandoned. The 
corruption that is deep rooted in Syria’s authoritarian regime and the crony capitalism that 
emerged after the reforms were key elements, drawing Syria’s malfunctioning economy. 
The policies pursued by Abdullah Dardari were mainly based on “capital accumulation” 
rather than “fair equality and distribution”. Consequently, small businesses manufacturers 
and enterprises were out of business due to the reduction in Tariffs and increased incentives 
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for outside investments. Consequently, Syrian middle and lower classes believed that the 
state is abandoning them for the sake of rich people. Although Assad was warned about 
the consequences of such policies, it was too late for him to repair the damage caused by 
the patronage system (Hinnebush, Syria: from "Authoritarian Upgrading" to Revolution 
2012). 
 2.3.2-Secterianism and Geopolitics  
 The complexity of the Syrian conflict and how it emerged cannot be limited to the 
explanation of sectarianism. Rather, sectarianism was a tool that was correlated and 
coexisting with the policies pursued by Assad’s regime. These policies focused on 
rewarding and guarantying privileges to people who are loyal to the regime, mainly based 
on sectarian identities. Recognizing the importance of the Sunni majority in Syria, Assad 
made sure to integrate the upper class Sunni business elite into the privileges system and 
establish a network of clientelism to guarantee his social support. On the other hand, 
neglected people- mainly from the suburbs- were mostly Sunnis affected by Assad’s 
liberalization of the economy.  
The social fabric in Syria is a multi-ethnic society where the Sunni majority 
coexisted with minorities such as Christians, Druze, Alawites and other minority groups. 
Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, protests were mainly based on secular ideologies 
demanding democratic reforms. Protestors were mostly Sunnis from the suburbs that were 
affected by the neglect of the Syrian regime and its economic reforms. Thus, the trigger of 
the uprising was not merely sectarian; it was rather the geographic distribution of the Syrian 
people that coincided with unequal development and unequal distribution between center 
and periphery measures (Berti and Paris 2014). 
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As the conflict proceeded and the protests escalated in scattered areas of the 
country, the security forces of the regime continued suppressing the protests violently. 
Assad repeatedly echoed the risks accompanied with the regime fall, threatening the 
minorities in Syria. While the regime self-defense groups -mainly Alawite- committed 
atrocities to the protestors, Sunni protestors started to fight back with increased hatred 
towards the Alawite minority (Berti and Paris 2014).  The conflict then began to have a 
sectarian sentiment, especially in Homs, where sectarian atrocities were committed from 
both sides. The government declared the death of many Syrian army soldiers and security 
forces and announced that it was the government’s duty to protect the Syrian people from 
terrorism that had been striking the country. Sectarianism and tribalism were the 
replacement for the government’s neglect of these suburbs. The Ba’ath ideology, based on 
national identity was no longer effective once the regime was shaken and people got 
inspired by other successful revolutions in the Arab world. In Dera’a where it all began, 
the sense of tribalism outweighed the common fear of the regime. Ancient grievances were 
now revisited and strengthened by the overreaction of the security forces acts (Hinnebush, 
Syria: from "Authoritarian Upgrading" to Revolution 2012). Fragmentation began to 
escalate in certain areas of the country where Sunnis and Alawites were deeply divided. 
Soon enough, peaceful protestors were replaced by hardliner extremists fighting the 
regime, supported by external agendas and states such as Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. 
These events declared the beginning of the civil war in Syria. It was a Sunni uprising 
against the Alawite dominated regime run by Bashar Al-Assad (Sengupta 2012). 
Accordingly, sectarianism in Syria cannot be explained without examining the 
geopolitical dimension of the region. The best explanation for understanding the 
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geopolitics of the region is by framing it as a regional cold war between two leading 
players: Iran and Saudi Arabia. Both states used the existing condition of weak states in 
the Arab region as a means to achieve their end of hegemony. Sectarian control and 
hegemony were not the primary goals of these two states; their goal was a regional balance 
of power and sectarianism was a tool to achieve their goal. While the two camps fighting 
in Syria -the regime and the opposition- were not able to shift the balance of power to their 
respective sides, nor survive on their own, external reliance was crucial to their survival. 
Whereas the conflict in Syria began to experience a sectarian sentiment, it was expected to 
find sectarian and co-religious supporters to sponsor their existence (Gause 2014). Without 
a doubt, Syria’s geographical location is among the primary interests for these regional 
powers. Each of these regional players view Syria as an opportunity to counter balance 
their rivalries as well as assure their own interests in the region (Heydemann 2013). As 
Salloukh summarizes “the sectarianiation of the geopolitical struggle over Syria, alongside 
the regime’s brutality, has altered its uprising from a peaceful quest for democratic reforms 
to a civil war that has ruptured the country’s national unity” (Salloukh 2013). 
2.3.3-Institutional Factor 
 Corruption was deeply embedded in the Syrian regime. Bribery and abuse of power 
were common in the public sector in Syria. Whereas authoritarian control, dictatorship and 
the absence of a free market occur, corruption emerges as a substitute for the government’s 
lack and inability to provide fair and equal opportunities. Capital monopoly and crony 
capitalism in Syria increased corruption which negatively affected ordinary people (AL-
Sheikh and Hamadah Syrian Economic Forum). Nevertheless, the increase in the 
population without providing the proper strategies to deal with such increase led to higher 
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unemployment rates and a dramatic increase of population in the capital. People were 
deprived from their rights of education and medical care. Grievances were accumulating 
in poor areas that were deprived from their rights due to the lack of institutional 
infrastructure that can contain population enlargement. Poverty was increasing, caused by 
higher unemployment rates and corruption. Indeed, a social crisis was piling up (Deeb 
2013). 
 On the other hand, the government’s mistakes were manifested in cutting the 
government’s subsidies and an uncontrolled inflation that caused the deterioration in the 
living conditions of the middle and lower classes in the peripheries of the country (Berti 
and Paris 2014). In contrary to the Ba’ath secular ideology, Assad persisted on building 
and spreading Islamic schools and charities. It was his strategy to counter radical Islam in 
Syria. Mosques were built and preaches were widespread. Consequently, due to the lack of 
governmental institutions and their ability to provide basic needs of people, Islamic schools 
and charities replaced the gap. Islamic movements seized the opportunity in the periphery 
to manipulate people who suffered from an increase in illiteracy and the neglect of 
governmental support (Hinnebush, Syria: from "Authoritarian Upgrading" to Revolution 
2012). Once the government was not able to provide their needs, people resorted to 
tribalism, sectarianism and religion. Indeed, protests were occurring after the Friday 
prayers where people were gathered listening to the Sheikh’s preach.  
 To summarize, the lack of governmental institutions, the higher rates of 
unemployment, illiteracy and people resorting to religion rather than the governments’ 
institutions, were substantial factors contributing to the Syrian conflict.  
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2.3.4- International Forces 
 Understanding the Syrian conflict needs a deep examination of the role of 
international players regarding the Syrian conflict. The conflict in Syria cannot be merely 
explained as an external conspiracy aiming to destroy Syria. However, the conflict in Syria 
was intensified upon the interests of major powers.  
Since the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the latter changed its foreign policy 
towards the Middle East from maintaining the status quo to war on terror and changing 
alliances. Syria was among the main targets of the United States. Syria’s support for the 
axis of resistance and its relations with Iran and Hezbollah were sufficient for the U.S to 
declare Syria as a state sponsoring terrorism. Once Syria refused to become an ally to the 
United States, the decision was made to weaken Syria. Syria was labeled as a rogue state 
while economic and political sanctions were imposed on Syria (Kleib 2016). 
Since the beginning of the conflict, the United States declared its position towards 
Syria; Assad had to leave and give the chance to build a democratic Syria. As an attempt 
to counter Assad’s regime, the US helped in training, funding and arming “moderate 
opposition groups”. 
On the other hand, Russia chose to support Assad. Putin believed that Syria and 
Russia are fighting a common enemy which is political Islam and especially the extreme 
version. Moscow accepts as true that losing Syria to Islamism is a direct threat to Russia 
and its core interests. Consequently, Russia always urged the international community to 
respect the sovereignty of the Syrian state and the right of the Syrian people to determine 
the future of Syria.  
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Once each of the two pillars of the world chose their position, a proxy war emerged. 
Russia and the United States cold war was now being revisited in Syria. Syria’s 
geographical location, its linkage between the west and the east and its historical and 
present stand as a leading state in the Arab region, were all factors contributing to the 
importance of Syria to major powers. These same factors are contributing to the intensity 
of the conflict and the persistence of each involved powers to control Syria. Indeed, the 
geopolitical opportunities that Syria offers are significant. The oil and gas that Syria lies 
on are assets that both Russia and the United States are not willing to compromise on (Kleib 
2016).   
2.4- Conclusion  
To conclude, several factors caused the ignition of the protests in Syria, including 
mistaken economic strategies, corruption and dictatorship. On the other hand, the wave of 
the Arab Spring was encouraging, especially after the success of some of the revolutions. 
However, the intervention of regional and international actors in the Syrian conflict 
complicated the situation even more. In the meantime, a civil war, a regional balance of 
power and a proxy war are the facts shaping the Syrian situation. 
The next chapter applies the theoretical framework discussed in this chapter and 
illustrates how these factors caused the complexity of the current situation in Syria.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Regional and International Players Shaping 
the Complexity of the Syrian Conflict 
3.1- Introduction 
 Since the Arab Spring began, several Arab countries witnessed revolutions 
demanding democracy and reforms including Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain. 
Many of these revolutions succeeded in ousting their current leaders and restoring order 
afterwards. Syria, on the other hand, was another story. Peaceful protests were rapidly 
transformed into a war that tore Syria apart. Syria turned from a leading country in the 
Arab region into a cockpit of regional and international rivalries. On January 2011, just 
two months before the protests began, Assad declared that Syria was immune to the Arab 
Spring wave. Apparently, Assad was mistaken.  What caused Syria to move from peaceful 
protests claiming freedom and democracy into the world’s largest humanitarian crisis after 
World War 2, will be further explained in this chapter.   
 This chapter examines the theoretical propositions presented in the previous 
chapter. It analyzes the factors that caused the complexity of the Syrian conflict starting 
from the U.S- led invasion of Iraq, until the time of writing this thesis. Furthermore, it 
analyzes the role of regional actors in intensifying the sectarian conflict. It also illustrates 
the role of international players regarding the Syrian conflict.  
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3.2- U.S Led Invasion of Iraq 
 The U.S led invasion of Iraq was a turning point concerning the geopolitics of the 
region and the consequences for such invasion regarding the Syrian regime. Although 
Assad and Hussein were not allies, Assad declared he was against the invasion. He 
recognized the risks accompanied by such an invasion that would only intensify the 
sectarian conflict in the region as a whole. Indeed, Syria along with Iran and Hezbollah 
recognized that creating a stable democratic Iraq after the invasion would encourage the 
United States to pursue its reform agenda and democratic liberation process on many Arab 
States. Thus undeniably, the Syrian regime, accompanied by Iran’s expertise and 
Hezbollah, facilitated and supported the armed rebels in Iraq -especially Sunni Jihadists- 
fighting the occupation (Erlich 2015) (Salloukh 2013). 
 The U.S demands regarding the Syrian regime were manifested in Collin Powel’s 
visit to Damascus. It was clear that Powel was demanding Damascus to renounce its stance 
as a member of the axis of resistance and eliminate any relations with Hamas, Hezbollah 
and Iran. In other words, Syria was demanded to shift its strategies and policies towards 
increased and sustained cooperation with the United States. Indeed, once Assad refused 
these demands, he became a legitimate target to be weakened according to the neo-cons 
ruling the United States (Kleib 2016). 
 On the other hand, the U.S- led invasion of Iraq intensified the regional sectarian 
conflict. The main players were Saudi Arabia and Iran, contesting on regional hegemony. 
Both of these states were exercising a realistic balance of power using sectarian instruments 
to achieve their means.  Once the balance was shifted into Tehran’s favor, Saudi Arabia -
backed by the U.S- utilized sectarianism as a tool to rally support from GCC countries to 
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counter the Irani influence in the region represented by Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas 
(Salloukh 2013). 
3.3- The Complex Situation  
 Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, neither the regime nor the opposition 
seemed to be able to win the conflict militarily. The Syrian army and security forces were 
trained to fight traditional wars not street fights. This caused the army insufficiency to 
eliminate any kind of threat. On the other hand, the opposition was not able to unify itself 
for the greater cause; ousting Assad. The opposition in Syria was deeply divided among 
democratic secular opposition and extremist jihadists. Indeed, the absence of major 
defectors from the Syrian army and the inability of the armed opposition to form a national 
unity that could gain public support, were the major factors contributing to the inability for 
the opposition to win (Hinnebush 2012). 
On the other hand, the emergence of terrorist organizations in Syria such as ISIS 
and Al Nusra front, rendered the attempts of achieving a political settlement in Syria. 
Indeed, the Syrian people recognized the threats emerging from such organizations 
claiming Islamic caliphate in Syria. It was not only the Syrian people who recognized this 
threat; international actors did too. Even though Assad was seen as the worst case scenario, 
these terrorists would be even worse if they were to replace Assad. Soon enough, national 
unity among many Syrians proved to be resilient to any attempt of tearing Syria apart. This 
national unity, whether based on fear of the replacement or the deeply rooted Ba’ath 
ideology among Syrians, is what held some Syrian cities together till now (Heydemann 
2013). 
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 Consequently, due to the inability of neither the regime nor the opposition to end 
the conflict, external help was vital. The regime was supported by Russia, Iran and 
Hezbollah, while the opposition was mainly supported by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and 
the United States. Each of these external state and non-state actors had specific interests in 
fighting on behalf of their clients. Undeniably, their intervention intensified and 
complicated the Syrian conflict.   
3.3.1- Iran 
 The Iranian-Syrian relation is dated back to the Islamic revolution in Iran. Despite 
their ideological differences -Iran as an Islamic state and Syria as a secular state- , Syria 
and Iran had a common interest in countering Israeli power and furthering their anti-
imperialist ideology. Furthermore, Syria was one of the major supporters of Hezbollah 
which was originally created and trained by Iran. The three of them -Iran, Syria and 
Hezbollah- created the axis of resistance, or as called by the Bush administration “the axis 
of evil”. Syria was a geographical link that connected Iran to the Arab world and especially 
Lebanon. Indeed, maintaining Syria as an ally to Iran was a priority in the latter’s 
geopolitical agenda (Erlich 2015). This relation between Syria and Iran was a direct threat 
to the western ambitions in the region especially after the invasion of Iraq. The western 
concerns were obvious in Jack Chirac’s meeting with Rice on February 8, 2005 when he 
assessed that their priority was to prevent the establishment of the Shiite crescent in the 
region. He made it clear that if the Syrian regime was shaken as a cause of the Syrian forces 
withdrawal from Lebanon, a gap would emerge in the Shiite crescent and the regime would 
be replaced by a western-friendly leader whether Sunni or Christian (Kleib 2016). As a 
fact, these western concerns were not a cause that shook the Irani-Syrian relations. On the 
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contrary; the two states increased their level of coordination as an attempt to counter the 
U.S’ interests in the region, represented by the security of Israel and their geostrategic 
gains.  
 When the conflict began in Syria, Iran was one of the major allies to Assad’s 
regime. In fact, Iran declared that it supported Assad against the systematic destruction of 
the axis of resistance. Iran was not willing to compromise or lose its most important ally in 
the region (Erdbrink and Nordland 2012). From the international aspect, Iran’s support for 
Assad was justified as their sacred duty for protecting the Shiite holy places in Syria and 
fighting radical Islamists that could pose a direct threat to Iran’s own backyard (Erlich 
2015). Indeed, Iran supported the Syrian regime with all means militarily and financially. 
It was declared that Iranian experts were sent to Syria to train the army and security forces. 
Iran was paying back the favor to Syria who supported Iran during its 8 years’ war with 
Iraq and their cooperation in the axis of resistance (Kleib 2016). Iran recognized that it was 
targeted through Syria. As Robert Fisk revealed in his article, the war on Syria was based 
on lies. It was not a matter of protecting the Syrian people nor their hatred toward Assad; 
it was an attempt to crush Iran through its most important ally in the region, Syria (Fisk 
2012). 
 To summarize, factors in the region enhanced the urge for Iran and Syria to preserve 
their shared critical and strategic interests in the region. These developments were 
illustrated by: The U.S - led invasion of Iraq followed by the Assassination of Hariri in 
Lebanon, the departure of the Syrian troops from Lebanon and the 2006 war against Israel. 
These factors contributed to the level of intervention exercised by Iran and Hezbollah in 
Syria. Direct military support was provided to the Syrian regime as well as financial and 
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economic support by Iran as a substitute for the U.S sanctions on Syria (Heydemann 2013). 
Indeed, Iran was not willing to lose its most important ally in the region especially after 
Iraq’s tipping into the favor of Tehran. Although sectarianism was used by Iran to rally 
support for Assad, it is a superficial facade for what Iran’s true intentions were; preserving 
its interests in the region as a realist balance of power. 
3.3.2- Saudi Arabia 
 Tension between Syria and Saudi Arabia began after the 2006 war in Lebanon. 
Assad accused Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries of being “Ashbah al Rijal” or half-
men, as a result of Saudi Arabia holding Hezbollah accountable for the 2006 war and its 
position towards the kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers. On the other hand, other factors 
contributed to the increased tension; Saudi’s support of resolution 1559 and holding Syria 
accountable for the assassination of Rafik Al Hariri, Syria’s facilitation for Saudi people 
to engage in the Iraq’s war against the American occupation and Syria’s support to 
Hezbollah and Iran (Varulkar 2007). 
 Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, Saudi Arabia urged Assad to comply 
with the people’s will. However, as soon as the conflict began to escalate, Saudi Arabia 
was among the first states to support the armed Sunni opposition. The hostile intentions of 
Saudi Arabia were obvious through its media channel -Al- Arabiya-. This channel hosted 
all kinds of opposition groups and focused only on one part of the story. Indeed, Al-Arabiya 
covered only a part of the story and sometimes exaggerated the violence practiced, stating 
baseless accusations. Being the owner of a channel such as Al-Arabiya gave Saudi Arabia 
the chance to alter public opinion through its channel that was commonly known in the 
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region. Media propaganda was among the main approaches of Saudi Arabia to weaken the 
Syrian regime.  
 The second approach used by Saudi Arabia was arming and supporting the armed 
Sunni opposition. Saudi Arabia’s main support was presented to the national coalition, the 
free Syrian army and the moderate Salafists. In other words, Saudi Arabia supported the 
Sunni camp in Syria with the exception of Al Qaeda-affiliated groups and the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Berti and Paris 2014). When Saudi Arabia decided that the Free Syrian Army 
was not achieving its ends, it shifted its main support towards more Salafist groups. In fact, 
Saudi Arabia essentiality contributed to the emergence of the Islamic Front in 2013 but 
remained salient towards any group affiliated with Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Indeed, divisions existed also in the Sunni Camp. The inability of Turkey, Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia to form a powerful Sunni axis in the region similar to its counter axis of resistance 
is due to the hostility between the Salafist ideology represented by Saudi Arabia and the 
Muslim Brotherhood represented by Turkey and Qatar. The moderate Islamic ideologies 
that were emerging in Egypt and Turkey were both considered as a direct threat to the Saudi 
monarchy. For Saudi Arabia it wasn’t a matter of sectarianism; rather, it was its strategic 
interests achieved by sectarian means (Gause 2014).  
 On the other hand, the United States and Saudi Arabia sealed an arrangement for 
training and funding the rebels in Syria. While the CIA took the lead of training the rebels, 
Saudi Arabia supported the arrangement with funding and armaments. Jordan was the 
location for these trainings it must have gotten financial revenue from the deal. On the 
other hand, the mutual interests of Saudi Arabia and the United States are what had hold 
the US silent for the Saudis abuse of human rights (Mazzetti and Apuzzojan 2016) . 
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 To summarize, Saudi Arabia’s strategic interests in Syria were: 1- to counter the 
Shiite axis of resistance represented by Iran, Hezbollah and Syria, 2-to preserve its strategic 
interests as a dominant actor in the region after Assad’s regime falls, 3- to maintain its 
special relations with the United States and preserve its own security against any external 
threat. 4-to secure Saudi Arabia’s own back yard against the emerging threats in Syria, 
represented by ISIS that is seeking an extremist Islamic caliphate all over the world. 
3.3.3- Qatar 
 Even though Qatar is a relatively small country with small population and no 
military power, it managed to have an effective role in the region. Qatar’s wealth as well 
as its foreign policy choices as a mediator in the region were among the major factors 
contributing to Qatar’s exceptionalism. Qatar was the mediator among many states during 
many occasions. On the other hand, Al-Jazeera media channel was a primary media tool 
used by Qatar to earn a credible regional audience and affect the public opinion. Al-Jazeera 
was the main diffuser of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology. Consequently, Qatar benefited 
from a special relation with the United States which created mutual strategic ties between 
the two states. Overall, Qatar’s strategies varied between “balancing and band-wagoning, 
co-optation and accommodation” (Salloukh 2013). 
 Syria and Qatar experienced special and personal relations between Assad and 
Hamad. The two states strengthened their economic ties and signed multiple trade treaties. 
In contrast, these relations did not prevent Qatar from changing its pragmatic position as a 
balancer into a bandwagon for securing their interests in post Assad Syria. Qatar repeatedly 
through its media channel -Al-Jazeera-hosted Muslim Brotherhood figures as an attempt 
to alter the public opinion and as a support to the Brotherhood in Syria. On October 26, 
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2011 a meeting was held between the Arab delegation headed by Sheikh Hamad and Assad. 
It was clear that Hamad’s priority was at least to include the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
regime or take every chance for overthrowing the regime. Just two weeks after the meeting 
was held, Hamad declared at the Arab league the suspension of the Syrian membership in 
the league and imposing sanctions on Syria (Kleib 2016). 
 Syria, on the other hand, recognized that Qatar had further interests in Syria other 
than claiming reforms from Assad. As the conflict proceeded regionally and 
internationally, Qatar started supporting the opposition, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood, 
logistically and militarily. A Special Forces unit was deployed at the Syrian Turkish 
borders and a joint operation room was established to train the groups and facilitate the 
weapons smuggling into Syria.  
 Overthrowing Assad became the first priority to Hamad. He considered the battle 
with Assad as his personal battle and that his failure in doing so would jeopardize his own 
position’s security. Indeed, Hamad’s concerns were true; when Hamad failed in achieving 
any effective attempt of throwing Assad, he abdicated and was replaced by his son Tamim 
(Kleib 2016). 
 To sum up, Qatar’s foreign policy and strategies were built on the urge for survival 
of such a small state. Qatar’s mediating role was perceived at the international aspect as a 
peace broker in a war prone region. On the other hand, Qatar’s open channels and 
communications with various disputants was a strategy to downgrade its opponents in the 
region. Qatar’s lack of military power caused the state to use its soft power as a guarantee 
of its regional and international role (Kamrava 2011). 
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 Once the Arab spring emerged, Qatar played an essential role in regime changing 
in Egypt and Libya. As for Syria, Qatar changed its pragmatic position and heavily 
supported Islamic movement as a result of Qatar’s anticipation of more geographical 
weight in post-Assad Syria. Qatar situated itself as the Muslim Brotherhood’s center of 
attention and pursued influential strategies through its channel -Al Jazeera- and through its 
military and financial support for the combatants in Syria. Qatar’s hopes seem to have gone 
with the wind as the Assad regime is still in power. 
3.3.4- Turkey 
Turkey, the bridge between the west and the east, played a major role in the region 
in the past ten years.  Since 2002, after the development and justice party came to rule, 
Turkey observed a doctrine called “zero problems with neighbors” which had been 
effective until the past few years. On the other hand, Syria, which was part of the Ottoman 
Empire till the First World War and a neighbor border state with Turkey, experienced many 
variable relations with Turkey.  Because of the Syrian support for the Kurdistan working 
party, the two countries almost engaged into war until Syria expelled the PKK leader 
Abdallah Ocalan. From the period between 2002 and 2011, Syria and Turkey had many 
diplomatic and economic relations as well as personal relations between the Turkish prime 
minister Rajab Tayb Erdogan and the Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad. Turkey’s doctrine 
about “zero problems with neighbors” had worked so well until the uprising in the Arab 
countries began. (Larrabee 2007). 
As tension began to spread in the region, Turkey could not stay neutral, especially 
regarding Syria. Turkey reaffirmed since the beginning of the so-called Arab spring in 
Syria, the need for the Syrian regime to comply with the will of people and apply reforms 
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and renovation. This strategy was emphasized in many visits by Turkish officials to Syria 
and phone calls from Erdogan to Assad.  However, all of these demands by the Turkish 
government were never heard, leading Turkey to change its position towards Al-Assad and 
support the opposition. Nevertheless, this change in the Turkish foreign policy towards 
Syria led it to alter its core principle of zero problems with neighbors and give up Turkey’s 
role as a mandate between the west and the east in the whole Middle East region (Mabley 
2012). 
There are many reasons that lies behind this transformation in Turkey’s foreign 
policies towards Syria, such as Turkey’s increased interests in the Middle East rather than 
the European Union, Erdogan and the AKP’s role as an Islamic power trying to dominate 
the region and s enforce its power domestically and the myth of returning the glory to the 
Ottoman Empire (Bahman 2013) (Cornell 2012). 
. A the crisis in Syria began to evolve , Turkey considered the domestic issues of 
Syria as its main concern and  cut off all its relations with Syria including diplomatic 
missions as well as trade. Turkey’s role as a mediator failed; its involvement in the 
domestic issues in Syria and support to the opposition did nothing but intensify the crisis. 
On the other hand, Turkey frequently repeated the need for the international community 
and NATO to interfere in Syria, force a no-fly zone and give aids and arms to the militant 
opposition in Syria, consisting of the FSA -Free Syrian Army- and extremists such as al 
Nusra front and the Islamic state of Iraq and Syria. These requests led to deploy the patriot 
missile defense system all along the Turkish-Syrian borders under the NATO in January 
2013. However, the international community failed to initiate any military act against 
Syria, leaving Turkey alone in the scene having some military interactions with Syria; 
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Turkish air forces shot down a Syrian air force jet and conducted many bombings around 
the borders between the Syrian army and the Turkish army. After all, the foreign policies 
that had shaped Turkey’s position toward Syria before 2011 gave Turkey the legitimacy to 
interfere in Syrian domestic issues and the region as a whole, as Erdogan said in his victory 
of the elections speech in 2011:“friendly and brotherly nations from Baghdad, Damascus, 
Beirut, Amman, Cairo, Sarajevo, Baku, and Nicosia, The Middle East, the Caucasus, and 
the Balkans have won as much as Turkey,". This statement by Erdogan shows Turkish 
intentions to be the major regional power that could influence and interfere in other 
countries (Pope 2013) (Kleib 2016) 
Throughout the years before the revolution in Syria, there was no evidence of 
differentiation or a religious-biased relationship between Erdogan who is a Sunni Muslim, 
considered from the Muslim brotherhood and Bashar Al-Assad who is an Alawite Muslim. 
However, after the crisis began, it was alleged that Erdogan’s foreign policies towards 
Syria and other countries with uprisings were based on religious considerations. In Egypt 
for example, Erdogan supported the former president Morsi who is from the Muslim 
brotherhood. He also considered the coups that took place illegal and asked the 
international community to act against Morsi’s departure.  
Regarding Syria, Erdogan made it very clear that he supports the Sunni camp in 
Syria and has been accused of supporting the militias that are Islamist extremists. This 
foreign policy pursued by Erdogan indicated Turkey’s intentions towards helping and 
encouraging the Muslim brotherhood to control the region. Furthermore, if Bashar Al-
Assad was to fail, the Muslim brotherhood, which would take over the regime, could be an 
added value to Erdogan’s regime in Turkey. Erdogan’s position will not only be enforced 
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in other countries; his power will also be imposed domestically inside Turkey. This nested 
game he is applying where he is trying to empower the Muslim brother hood in the whole 
region as well as trying to enforce his power domestically, Erdogan is trying to balance 
between the domestic and international issues while emphasizing on the importance of the 
Muslim brotherhood.  
 Many scholars predicted that arming and opening borders to jihadists and 
extremists will have a reverse effect on Erdogan. First, these extremists might come back 
to Turkey and create greater instability. Second, Turkish citizens will be aware that 
Erdogan’s intervention in other countries’ domestic issues is unacceptable. Turkey, in 
accordance with mainly Qatar and Saudi Arabia, had a common agenda for supporting the 
spread of political Islam in the region. However, what seems to be happening right now is 
that all the agendas related to the domination of political Islam in the region have failed in 
many countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and also Syria. The coherence of the regime in 
Syria, the brutal actions by the extremists and the lack of social acceptance to the political 
and militant Islam were the main reasons for the failure of these agendas. Even western 
countries such as the United States of America and other European countries that were 
supporters to the uprisings in Syria are now reconsidering the support they are giving to 
the opposition because the spread and empowerment of these militant groups can be a 
threat to international security as a whole  
Turkey was allegedly using its soft power in order to oblige the Syrian regime to 
stop the bloodshed and violence against civilians.  However, the level of involvement of 
Turkey did not stop at the point of soft power; even though Turkey did not conduct a 
military intervention inside Syrian territories, its involvement in supporting opposition 
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militant groups is now known to a wide degree. In fact, Turkey had the intentions to 
militarily intervene in Syria when there was a leak of a conference between Davutoglo and 
the head of intelligence of Turkey, discussing a way they could find a motive to initiate a 
military act. The leaks were about Turkey’s intentions to send few men to Syria to launch 
missiles against Turkish territories allowing the Turkish government to assume this act was 
executed by the Syrian government and giving it the right to reply and intervene military 
in Syria, in order to secure its own territory. No Turkish official claimed the falsity of these 
leaks; they only emphasized the need to find out who leaked the conference.  
Turkey believe that it has it’s the right to initiate a war with Syria and try to take 
down the regime and help the opposition, to get to the rule when the conquests are done. 
Many consequences might have been yielded if this act was committed by Turkey. Firstly, 
it is not only Syria and Turkey that are involved in the scene;   there is a whole axis between 
Russia, Iran, Syria and Hezbollah on one side and, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and its 
western allies on the other. Moreover, the West, including USA and Europe, seems 
reluctant about any military action against Syria which could lead to a world war 3. Also, 
Qatar seems to be not as active as it used to be before. Furthermore, , Turkey might need 
to consider Russia in any further step regarding Syria; Turkey’s dependency for energy is 
mainly on Russia and Iran ,both strong allies to Al-Assad regime. Therefore, any military 
act against Syrian sovereignty will have a harmful impact on Turkish foreign policies with 
Russia and Iran (Falk 2012) (Kleib 2016) (Erlich 2015)(Pope, Pax Ottomana? The Mixed 
Success of Turkey's New Foreign Policy 2010) 
Apparently, Turkey chose the Muslim Brotherhood over its most important ally in 
the region, Syria. Syria, which was a bridge to Turkey’s geopolitical interests in the region, 
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now became its worst enemies. What used to be called the doctrine of zero problems with 
neighbors is now becoming zero neighbors without problems. Whether it is Turkey’s 
aspirations to become a hegemonic power in the region as the leader of moderate Islamic 
ideology or strengthen and ensure its geopolitical interests in the region, neither of these 
two strategies seem to be feasible.  
3.3.5- Russia 
 Russia and Syria have been allies for a long time. Since the Soviet Union, Syria and 
the USSR established a special relationship as a result of their counter-American/Israeli 
ideology in the region. Indeed, the two states shared a sense of common ideology between 
the Syrian secular Ba’athists and the Marxist Leninist ideology of the Soviet Union. Since 
then, Syria and USSR -now Russia- signed military pacts concerning weaponries trade and 
establishing a Russian military base in Tartous (Erlich 2015). 
 Consequently, since then the two states have had a sustained systematic relationship 
as an attempt to preserve their mutual interests in the region. Due to the collapse of the 
USSR and the emergence of a unipolar world, Russia’s geopolitical interests were shifted 
towards the Middle East. Russia’s aim was to preserve its economic interests regarding the 
gas and oil pipelines through the Middle East, as a result of Russia’s weakened position in 
Eastern Europe.  
 Accordingly, the relationship between Assad and Putin was enhanced. Once the 
Syrian conflict emerged, Russia systematically supported Assad diplomatically and 
militarily. Both Russia and china vetoed a UN resolution holding Assad’s regime 
accountable for the atrocities committed in Syria. Russia also sent weaponries and military 
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experts to Syria to help the regime. Russia intervened militarily in Syria by airstrikes, upon 
the Syrian government’s request for help against rebels and jihadist groups.  Medvedev 
declared that these airstrikes were protecting Russia from terrorists threats (Kleib 2016). 
 Indeed, there are several factors justifying the Russian intervention in the Syrian 
conflict. First of all, Russia had a consistent fear from political Islam and jihadists.  
Estimates revealed that by 2050 Islam will be the major religion in the Russian Federation  
(Kleib 2016). The rise of such extremist and Islamist groups in Syria would pose a direct 
threat to Russia’s own back yard. Such a rise would inspire similar groups in Russia to 
rebel. Indeed, since the estimates were revealed, extreme Muslim communities began to 
spread, expanding and triggering religious conflict in Russia. On the other hand, reports 
revealed that the vast majority of jihadists in Syria are from Chechnya. Thus, Putin’s aim 
was to eliminate these jihadists in Syria before they had the chance to come back to North 
Caucasus and provoke the situation there (Hill 2016). 
Second, Putin’s priority was for Russia to become a major power again. Indeed, 
Russian strategies in the Middle East and especially in Syria, emphasize Putin’s will to 
counter the west and reduce the American-western efforts to oust Assad. Apparently, a new 
American-Russian cold war is revisited in Syria. By all means, Putin had proportionally 
won in Syria. The Russian airstrikes caused dramatic shifts towards the Syrian regime’s 
favor and Assad seems to be more resilient than before (Aleksashenko 2016). 
The third factor is preserving the Russian strategic interests in the region. Through 
time, oil and gas pipelines were major contributors to the Russian-American cold war. 
Since the relations with Eastern Europe deteriorated, Russia’s replacement for ensuring its 
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economic agenda, was the Middle East. All regional and international powers involved in 
the Syrian conflict recognize Syria’s strategic location regarding the pipelines connecting 
the Middle East with Europe. Consequently, the new findings of a genuine amount of gas 
that Syria lies on was a major factor contributing to the regional and international conflict. 
While the United States along with Qatar and other regional players sought to control the 
Syrian gas and its strategic path, Russia, on the other hand, was not willing to compromise 
its most important ally and its geostrategic interests in the region for the sake of the West 
(Kleib 2016). 
To summarize, Russia’s intervention in Syria is a multilayered strategy containing 
several aspects. Russia claims that its intervention in Syria is a holy war to protect the 
Christian Orthodox in Syria and the region. On the other hand, Russia is trying to eliminate 
any threat emerging from political Islam through Syria to protect its own homeland against 
any insurgencies. Furthermore, Russia’s aim of reemerging as a major power is a strategy 
pursued in Syria by countering the Western influence in the region. At last, Russia’s 
geostrategic interests are being pursued and preserved through keeping Assad in power. 
3.3.6- United States 
 Inconsistency is the best word to explain the Syrian-American relations. 
Throughout time, the two states worked together to achieve their mutual interests and at 
many times they were enemies, but never allies. The United States never understood how 
a small state in the Arab region was brave enough to position itself as the defender of Arab 
nationalism and anti-imperialist influence with such limited resources. Indeed, Hafez Al-
Assad through his personality, cleverness and diplomacy, managed to turn Syria into a 
powerful and leading state in the region. The realist Assad recognized the importance of 
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balanced powers in the Middle East to maintain the status quo and limit the Israeli influence 
in the region. Indeed, Hafez Al Assad’s first priority was to contain the Israeli hopes of 
expansion. Consequently, Assad’s strategies were illustrated by securing his internal front 
through creating a major external threat represented by the United States and Israel. Even 
though the United States was the enemy, Hafez Al Assad always made sure to keep a space 
for dialogue, not eternal boycott. As Henry Kissinger described Hafez Al Assad, “his level 
of cleverness was abnormal, his patriotic feeling was never questioned.” (Seale 2015). 
 After the inauguration of Bashar Al-Assad, the United States’ ambitions were 
downsized to this young modernized president who was expected to change Syria’s 
position and ideology. However, young Assad seemed to have inherited his father’s 
stubbornness. Through panels of negotiation between the United States and Syria, the latter 
seemed unwilling to compromise any of Syria’s’ ideologies or strategies that were once 
pursued.  
 The United States’ strategies and priorities were never changed regarding Syria, 
even after the conflict began.  The United States supported any action that would eventually 
lead to overthrow Assad; destroying Syria had many benefits regarding the U.S regional 
strategic interests. First of all, destroying Syria will secure the Israeli interests and stability 
in the region. Second, the United States’ priority was to counter the Iranian influence in 
the region and the elimination of the axis of resistance. Third of all, countering the Russian 
influence internationally and regionally was among the first priorities regarding the Syrian 
conflict. At last, the United States sought to secure its economic and geostrategic interests 
in the region through destroying Syria. (Erlich 2015) 
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 As the conflict in Syria emerged, the United States supported the armed rebels and 
especially, the Free Syrian Army and moderate Islamic rebels. The United States even 
threatened to strike Syria if Assad crossed the “red line”. The tension between the two 
states was unprecedented. An arrangement was sealed based on destroying the Syrian 
chemical weapons. This arrangement demonstrated the American willingness to 
compromise its red line in order to secure its interests (Erlich 2015). 
 Divide and conquer was the main strategy pursued by the United States. Due to the 
inability to intervene in Syria militarily, it was the optimal chance to destroy Syria from 
the inside and take advantage of the Syrian regime’s mistakes while intensifying the 
sectarian and regional conflict (Kleib 2016). 
Many reports and leaked classified documents were illustrating how the United 
States was planning to destroy Syria, leading all the way to Iran. Robert Fisk emphasized 
how the Syrian war was based on lies and hypocrisy manifested by all powers involved in 
the conflict. “The big truth” that Fisk’s refers to is that the Syrian conflict and its escalation 
and importance to regional and international powers is a way to counter and destroy Iran 
and eliminate its nuclear threat. As Fisk demonstrates, it was never a matter of human rights 
nor the love for the Syrian people, it was all about Iran. (Fisk 2012) 
As said before, inconsistency is what shapes the U.S strategies towards Syria, even 
after the conflict. In fact, the United States wanted nothing more than the overthrowing of 
Bashar Al-Assad, as long as he is not to be replaced by extremist groups such as ISIS. The 
United States would like nothing more than reducing the Iranian influence in the region, 
but at the same time, it’s not willing to compromise the regional leadership to radical 
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Islamists especially in Iraq and Syria. It is better according to the United States to deal with 
the devil they already know rather than a new one. After the U.S failed till now to oust 
Assad, new priorities had to be drawn. To sum up, the United States is driven by its regional 
interests, seeking every strategy as an attempt to secure its regional interests. These 
interests are driven by: the security of Israel, countering the Iranian influence, countering 
the Russian influence and securing its economic and strategic interests in the region 
represented by its regional allies (Gause 2014). 
 3.3.7- The Geopolitics of the Middle East 
 The geopolitical analysis is a fundamental factor regarding the Syrian conflict. 
Syria is a multi-ethnic community that had lived in harmony for decades. Sectarian 
divisions never seemed to be a problem triggering a civil war in Syria. Indeed, the secular 
Ba’ath ideology had managed to create a sense of national identity that supersedes any 
other sectarian/tribal identity. Nationalism was the most prominent factor shaping the 
Syrian identity (Sadowski 2002). 
 Consequently, the U.S- led invasion of Iraq was a major factor contributing to the 
regional conflict in the Middle East. After the Iraqi government collapsed, a conflict rose 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran as an attempt to control Iraq. A realistic balance of power 
game was exercised by the two key players in this conflict. The conflict itself illustrated 
the importance of the geostrategic position of Iraq and the added value for any state who 
controls it. Iran viewed Iraq as a geostrategic linkage connecting Iran to the Arab world, 
while Saudi Arabia sought to contain Iraq as an attempt to reverse the Iranian influence in 
the region. Indeed, a geopolitical conflict was instigated where sectarianism was a tool to 
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achieve the two states objectives in Iraq. Both of these states had used sectarianism in order 
to rally allies as an attempt to counter each other (Salloukh 2013). 
 Regarding Syria, it was the regional geopolitical contest manifested by sectarian 
means, along with the regime brutality and the increased reliance on the Alawite sect to 
crush the opposition that transformed the Syrian claims for democracy and reforms into a 
bloody civil war. Indeed, the weakness of the Syrian state and the domestic insurgencies 
had drawn in regional and international powers as an attempt to increase their interests as 
a classic power of balance game. Sectarian identities were not created by the regional 
conflict; they were a tool to achieve their objectives. The brutal acts and violence 
committed by the regime forced the majority Sunni groups to seek sectarian affiliates to 
rally support and oust the Alawite minority rule. Saudi Arabia and Iran had the perfect 
chance to assert their projection of objectives through Syria. The conflict in Syria was an 
opportunity to Saudi Arabia to counter the Iranian influence in the region especially after 
Iran’s containment of Iraq (Gause 2014) 
 Saudi Arabia used the conflict in Syria to ensure its geopolitical calculations in the 
region. Controlling post-Assad Sunni dominated Syria represented a reasonable 
compensation to Saudi Arabia for its failure in Iraq (Salloukh 2013).  While Saudi Arabia’s 
main support goes to Islamic rebels in Syria, Iran’s support for the regime intensified the 
conflict even more.  Sectarianism oversimplifies the conflict in Syria; it is rather a 
geopolitical conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran drawn by sectarian elements (Berti and 
Paris 2014). 
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 With the inability of both the regime and the opposition to win the conflict, regional 
support was an essential instrument to shore up military and financial aids. This regional 
support was illustrated and conducted on sectarian basis. Along with the regional conflict, 
the United States had been supporting the Saudi efforts to overthrow the regime in Syria, 
as an attempt to counter the Iranian influence and eliminate the threat emerging from the 
axis of resistance represented by Iran, Syria and Hezbollah (Heydemann 2013). 
 Therefore, the complexity of the Syrian conflict cannot be merely referred to as a 
sectarian civil war nor can the regional and international intervention be referred to as an 
attempt to protect human rights and ensure democracy. If sectarian divisions were the 
driving element for the emergence of the conflict, then why did it not happen any sooner? 
On the other hand, if the involvement of regional and international powers was justified by 
the need to protect human rights and the urge to spread democracy, then why did these 
powers not intervene in a less democratic states than Syria? 
 The Syrian geostrategic position gave each player involved in the region a reason 
to view the Syrian conflict as their own interests. Syria is considered as the key that opens 
the opportunities to the rich infrastructure of the region. It provides the access to both Iraq 
and Iran and shares a cut along with Lebanon, Palestine and Israel of a significant amount 
of gas. Thus, controlling Syria was the key to control such valuable resources. According 
to the United States and its Western allies, dividing and destroying Syria was the optimal 
solution as an attempt to control it. After the fall of Iraq, Syria was the main Arab state 
threatening Israel’s security and the Western ambitions in the region. Thus, destroying 
Syria was essential regarding securing regional and international powers’ interests.  
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3.4-Conclusion 
 Unfortunately, Syrian blood was shed due to a conflict they had never seen coming. 
Syria found itself in the middle of an international and regional war that tore Syria apart. 
Indeed, no one had predicted that the Syrian state could survive such enormous pressure, 
but indeed till now, it has survived.   
 The blood scene became regular regarding Syria. Every day, atrocities are 
committed against the Syrian people. Syria that once used to be among the most secure 
countries in the world, now became the most dangerous one. Indeed, Syrian people have 
paid the price for the interests of international and regional powers. A civil war, regional 
geostrategic interests and proxy war are what draw the solid lines representing the Syrian 
conflict. After all, Syria’s future is no longer in the hands of Syrians only.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Political Settlements and Consociational 
Democracy as Syria’s Exit Strategy 
 
 This chapter explores the effect of declining nationalism ideology in Syria and the 
rise of communitarian ideologies instead. This rise of sectarianism –which is a part of 
communitarianism - in Syria and the region as a whole, could be attributed to the decline 
of national identity and the state-centric control of the country. In fact, sectarianism is a 
prominent factor shaping the Syrian conflict and the consequences affecting the whole 
region. This trend could be attributed to globalization’s double movement theory. 
 Indeed, increased interconnectedness and the global movement for economic and 
political liberalization rendered the state-centric control and caused the emergence of 
counter-movements based on communitarian protectionism (Salamey 2016). 
 Furthermore, this chapter discusses the effectiveness of applying a power sharing 
formula as a solution to the Syrian conflict. A comparative case study is used between 
Lebanon and Syria to assess the effectiveness of a consociational democracy model 
regarding Syria. Consequently, it manifests the political settlements provided regarding the 
Syrian conflict and what has been done regarding the conflict resolution.  
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4.1- Rise of Communitarian Politics 
 Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, Arab nationalism was not a major 
contributor to the emergence and escalation of this wave. On the contrary, Arab nationalism 
was countered by Islamic movements represented by the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Salafists. Indeed, these movements assumed power in many Arab states such as Egypt and 
Tunisia. Sectarianism on the other hand, was shaping the ongoing conflicts in the region 
especially in Yemen and Syria.   
 This shift in the Arab region can be best explained by globalization’s double 
movement theory. The theory discusses the correlation between the development of the 
global market and the rising opposing “local protectionism”. Indeed, the globalization 
movement represented by economic liberalization and increased interconnectedness 
among states, decreased the role of the nation state and the state’s control over the vital 
economical organs. This decrease in the state’s control over its vital organs increased the 
exposure of the nation’s local economic and political arena and decreased the state’s 
protectionism. Consequently, due to the state’s lack of protectionism, sectarianism was the 
best substitute. Undeniably, sectarianism was a tool to achieve common economic and 
political preservation once the state failed to do so. Regarding Syria, Islamic movements 
and Salafist were major players rallying support based on sectarian identities. On the other 
hand, regional and international players were involved in the Syrian conflict also based on 
sectarian identities escalating the regional sectarianism to an unprecedented level (Salamey 
2016). 
  Huntington’s clash of civilization is being revisited in the region and especially in 
Syria and Iraq. The emergence of extremist groups such as Al-Nussra Front and ISIS could 
57 
 
be attributed to these movements’ rejection of modernization and global integration. These 
movements seek an Islamic caliphate countering the western ideology. As Huntington 
explains, these civilizational differences will eventually clash. Indeed, globalization and 
the clash of civilization best explain the emergence of extremist groups in the region 
(Brooks 2011). As long as communitarianism and sectarianism keep defining the regional 
conflict, fragmentation and polarization are the major elements drawing the future of the 
region. 
 In light of the increased communitarianism in the region and the sectarian drives 
that are shaping the Syrian conflict, would it be effective to formulate a new governing 
formula similar to Lebanon’s consociational democracy? According to Lijphat, 
consociational democracy is a very useful technique and political model for deeply divided 
societies. Consociational democracy is a political formula where all subcultures are 
represented and governed by an elite cartel. Consociational democracy’s purpose is to turn 
a fragmented society into a stable democracy. Lijphart defines four characteristics in which 
consociational democracy could be implemented. The first one is the establishment or 
existence of a grand coalition where all parties are represented. Second, the veto power that 
can be used by one segment in order to topple any decision that could harm its interests. 
The third one is proportionality which means each segment is to be represented in the 
coalition in accordance with its proportion of the society. The fourth one is segmental 
autonomy which emphasizes on the importance for each segment to have a certain amount 
of autonomy in its jurisdiction. In accordance with those four characteristics, certain 
aspects are also preferred to exist in a society such as the existence of an elite cartel that 
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rules the subcultures and a relatively small size country in which each segment is relatively 
located in one geographical area (Lijphart 1969). 
4.2- Syria and Lebanon 
 A “Syrian Taif” was first proposed by Walid Junblat as the solution for the Syrian 
conflict. Even though, Lebanon and Syria have a lot in common, differences do exist. 
Taking into consideration the similarities, Lebanon and Syria both have similar historical 
backgrounds of “ethnic composition, socio-cultural behavior, economic and demographic 
developments, the periphery-center dichotomy, and the politicization of sectarianism and 
the interference of outside actors.”(Rosiny 2013). While on the other hand, Syria and 
Lebanon differ first in their political and economic systems. While Syria has been ruled by 
an authoritarian regime under Al-Baath Party, the Lebanese system since independence has 
been characterized by a power sharing formula with a free market economy.  Second, 
whereas Lebanon’s sectarianism has its deep roots in Lebanon, Syria was alleged to be a 
multi-ethnic society and a secular state. Third, Sunnis in Syria constitute the majority of 
the population whereas in Lebanon there is no one individual majority in the population 
(Rosiny 2013). These differences makes a Syrian Taif exactly like the Lebanese one 
unfeasible.  
  The political formula in Lebanon has not proven to be sufficient to prevent the civil 
war or to eliminate the instability in Lebanon. On the contrary, Lebanon has been locked 
in sectarian sentiment enforced by the consociational system which made the state more 
vulnerable to any outside interference and internal instability. The sectarian driven policies 
in Lebanon resulted in the absence of any hegemonic control over the society by any 
institution or ideology which caused the disfunctioning of the state’s administrative and 
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political institutions. Consociationalism in Lebanon preserved the social inequality if not 
increased it by the growing reliance on clientelism (Makdisi and Marktanner, Trapped By 
Consociationalism: The Case of Lebanon n.d.). 
 On the other hand, consociational democracy in Lebanon had an efficient aspect 
including freedom of expression, plural political formula and a non-autocratic regime, 
unlike the states surrounding Lebanon. But then again, it also led to weak political 
institutions and a weak central authority which aided in increasing the political instability 
and poor homogenous organs. The increased corruption and clientelism in Lebanon 
resulted in lack of concern regarding the public interest when compared to private interests. 
Consequently, deepened sectarian divisions in Lebanon smoothed the progress of the 
interference of external factors which intensified the instability (Makdisi and El-Khalil, 
Lebanon: the Legacy of Sectarian Consociationalism and the Transition to a Fully-fledged 
Democracy 2013). 
 Therefore, after examining the failure of consociational democracy in Lebanon and 
probing the causes of the Syrian conflict, consociational democracy could not be the 
optimal solution for the Syrian conflict for many reasons. First of all, the presence of a 
majority of Sunnis in Syria would have negative impact on the efficiency of equal 
representation. Second, the Sunnis in Syria do not have a common ideology that the 75% 
of the population would agree on and act as a homogenous group. The Sunni community 
in Syria is divided among Sunnis who support the regime, moderate secular opposition and 
extremely religious groups. It seems unlikely for these groups consisting the Sunnis in 
Syria to have a common purpose or claims (Rosiny 2013). Second, consociational 
democracy in Lebanon, as, did not prevent the emergence of the civil war. On the contrary, 
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it had deepened sectarian divisions that already existed. On the other hand, the fluidity of 
Trans-regional ideologies and sectarian sentiment as well as the interference of regional 
actors hinder the possibility of establishing a plural society. Corporate power 
rearrangements had been shaped by the “regional balance of power” instead of domestic 
groups interests (Salamey, Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative options 
2009). 
Third, the uprisings in Syria had been shaped at the beginning by an ideological 
and political frame rather than sectarian affiliations.  Later on, due to the sectarian 
regionalization and the role of external actors, sectarianism played a major role in shaping 
the conflict. Most Syrians through time reasserted on the principle of national unity and 
identity. Syrians put forward their national interest as Syrians regardless of their sectarian 
affiliations. (Deeb, Crisis in Syria 2013). Fourth, when referring to Lijphart, certain 
requirements are recommended to be present in a state in order to establish a successful 
model. These requirements include the presence of an elite cartel capable of 
accommodating the subcultures in a society. These elites must have the ability to persuade 
and control subcultures and ensure the need for a balanced integration among them 
(Lijphart 1969). In Syria, such elites do not exist. There is no elite cartel that controls 
subcultures and has the ability to accommodate them. Political leaders based on sectarian 
affiliations are not present in Syria. There is no one single leader who controls neither the 
Sunni majority nor the minorities in Syria.  
In a survey conducted by Dr. Deeb, he investigated the proportions regarding the 
Syrian conflict causes. The survey showed that the Syrian crisis is not totally an outside 
intervention nor is it a purely internal conflict. In fact, 60% of respondents believed that 
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the crisis is manipulated by external factors while 40% believed that it is internally 
originated. Below is a table showing the percentages of the Syrian conflict causes. 
Table 1. Syrian Crisis Factors. 
How do you describe the Syrian crisis? 
And how do you rank the factors? 
Yes No  Rank Weight of 
rank 
As “Arab Spring” 20 80 5 5% 
As “Damascus Spring” 30 70 4 10% 
As a media and diplomatic war 60 40 3 15% 
As continuation of the Syrian- Israeli 
confrontation 
75 25 2 20% 
As continuation of the Baath vs. Muslim 
Brothers struggle 
80 20 1 25% 
As an internal social and economic 
explosion 
30 70 4 10% 
As destruction of Syrian society and state 60 40 3 15% 
    100% 
Source: (Deeb, Crisis in Syria 2013) 
 Based on the table above and the causes represented in previous chapters, the 
conflict in Syria is divided into multi-layers that did not only emerge as an internal 
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revolution based on sectarian cleavages. Rather, the Syrian conflict is a complex conflict 
in which a changed political rearrangement such as consociationalism might not be 
sufficient to end the war. When comparing Syria to Lebanon, a consociationalism that 
failed in Lebanon which has the primary prerequisites for a successful model of 
consociational democracy would also fail in Syria that apparently does not have the 
fundamental requirements of successful consociationalism based on the reasons listed 
above.  
 Consequently, as the regional and international actors intervene in the Syrian 
conflict, consociational democracy might not be an “off the table solution”. Rather, these 
powers might decide that the best exit strategy of the Syrian conflict might be 
consociational democracy regardless of what might be the consequences of such 
arrangement. Indeed, once the Syrian institutions begin the process of sectarianizing these 
institutions, sectarianism would be a permanent feature drawing the solid lines of the 
Syrian state.  
4.3- Political Settlements Provided Regarding the Syrian Conflict  
Regarding the possible solutions for the Syrian conflict, it is obvious from the 
escalation of the Syrian conflict that the United Nations Security Council has failed to 
implement one of its basic duties of maintaining international peace and security. Many 
resolutions have failed to be adopted due to the mutual veto of both Russia and china. The 
UNSC was unable to hold the Syrian regime responsible for the atrocities committed in 
Syria. Facilitative mediation has also failed regarding effective negotiations to end the war 
in Syria. Kofi Annan ,who was assigned as a joint UN-Arab League special envoy to Syria, 
proposed a six point plan which included “ the implementation of a ceasefire, release of 
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political detainees, freedom of movement for journalists, freedom of association and the 
right to demonstrate, provision of humanitarian assistance to besieged civilians and 
initiation of political negotiation process led by Syrians.”. However, after President Assad 
agreed on Annan’s plan, the ceasefire was broken by both sides; the regime armed forces 
and the rebels. In June 2012, the Action Group on Syria issued the Geneva Communiqué 
which elaborated the need for ending the war and establishing a transitional government.  
Consequently, in August 2012, Annan resigned as an expression of his frustration 
regarding the peace talks and Lakhdar Brahimi was assigned as the special envoy to Syria.  
 Another round of negotiations was held in Switzerland in January, 2014. The aim 
of the second Geneva conference on Syria’ was to end the war in by bringing the conflicting 
parties to discuss the establishment of a transitional government and start the process for a 
new Syrian republic. The negotiations failed, according to Brahimi, due to the inability and 
unwillingness of all conflicting parties to agree on the principle of political solution in 
Syria. By mid-2014, Brahimi resigned. Staffan De Mistura proceeding Brahimi as the 
special envoy offered a proposal of “Four Committees Initiative” as an intent to start the 
peace process. The “Four Committees initiative” includes representatives from the 
government and the opposition to observe the ceasefire, reconstruction, a free and fair 
political election process and the observation of military and security acts. Even though the 
government agreed to the proposal, it has not made any binding promises or reforms, while 
the opposition was totally ruled out of the initiative.  
 Despite the various attempts of the UNSC to conduct a feasible resolution regarding 
Syria, the division among UNSC permanent members seems vital. It is clear that all the 
attempts to end the Syrian conflict including negotiations, mediations and third party roles 
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have failed. (Erlich, Inside Syria : The Backstory of Their Civil War and What The World 
Can Expect, 2014)(Deeb, Crisis in Syria, 2013)(Adams, 2015)(Four Committees Initiative, 
2015). 
Table 2. List of UNSC Resolutions Regarding the Syrian Conflict.  
14 April 2012 
RES.2042 
The authorization of the deployment of 30 
military observers to Syria 
21 April 2012 
RES.2043 
The establishment of UNSMIS 
20 July 2012  
RES.2059 
The extension of UNSMIS for a final period of 
30 days 
27 September 2013 
RES.2118 
Resolution adopted unanimously by the 
Council and required the verification and 
destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons 
stockpiles, calling for the convening of the 
Geneva second peace talks and endorsed the 
establishment of a transitional governing body 
in Syria with full executive powers 
22 February 2014  
RES.2139 
Demanding all parties in particular the Syrian 
authorities to allow humanitarian access in 
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Syria across conflict lines and in besieged 
areas and across borders and expressed the 
intent to take further steps in the case of non-
compliance 
14 July 2014 
RES.2156 
The authorization of a cross-border and cross-
line access for the UN and its partners to 
deliver humanitarian aid in Syria without state 
consent and established a monitoring 
mechanism for 180 days 
15 August 2014  
RES.2170 
Condemned the recruitment by ISIS and al-
Nusra of foreign fighters and listed six 
individuals affiliated with those groups under 
the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida sanctions regime 
24 September 2014 
RES.2178 
The expansion of the counter-terrorism 
framework by imposing obligations on 
member states to respond to the threat of 
foreign terrorist fighters 
17 December 2014 
RES.2191 
Renewed authorization for cross-border 
humanitarian access until 10 January 2016 
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12 February 2015 
RES.2199 
ISIS and Al-Nusra’s illicit funding via oil 
exports, traffic of cultural heritage, ransom 
payments and external donations 
6 March 2015 
RES.2209 
Condemned the use of toxic chemicals without 
attributing blame; stressed that those 
responsible should be held accountable 
7 August 2015 
RES. 2235 
Requesting the UN Secretary-General and 
OPCW Director-General to recommend the 
establishment and operation of a UN-OPCW 
joint investigative mechanism to determine 
responsibility for the use of chemical weapons 
in Syria 
20 November 2015 
RES.2249 
Called for member states to take all necessary 
measures on the territory under the control of 
ISIS to prevent terrorist acts committed by 
ISIS and other Al-Qaida affiliates 
18 December 2015  
RES.2254 
the first resolution focused exclusively on a 
political solution to the Syrian crisis. It was 
adopted unanimously. 
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26 February 2016 
RES.2268 
The cessation of hostilities and called for the 
resumption of political talks. 
Source: UN Documents for Syria, Security Council Resolutions 
 
4.4- Conclusion 
The complexity of the Syrian conflict increased the tendency for regional and 
international powers to be involved in any upcoming political settlements. Indeed, a 
political settlement in Syria cannot be implemented nor sufficient without the acceptance 
of the armed parties. This acceptance is linked and correlated with the regional and 
international powers’ intentions to end the conflict. Each one of these powers should 
impose obligations to their proxy affiliates on the ground to start the negotiation process. 
Consequently, one primary concern is likely to occur in any round of negotiations which 
is the Assad’s removal from power. Neither one of the two conflicting parties -the regime 
and the opposition- would accept such outcome. Assad and his affiliates would not 
surrender and give up the presidency while the opposition would not accept any transitional 
government including Assad (Cafarella 2015). 
 On the other hand, the rise of extremists in Syria poses a direct concern to all 
regional and international players involved in the conflict. Although some of these groups 
were listed on the terrorist groups list, their advancement in Syria and Iraq poses a direct 
question on whether Assad’s removal would be sufficient to end the war or if it would only 
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increase the fragmentation and the acts of terror conducted in Syrian territories (Cafarella 
2015). 
 Consequently, the failure of many negotiations regarding the Syrian conflict such 
as the Geneva conventions and the Vienna Frame work, is due to the inability to decide 
what parties should be included in these negotiations. The fragmentation of the opposition 
and the stubbornness of the regime and its allies decrease the tendency of accepting and 
mitigating any political settlement in Syria. On the other hand, the unwillingness of 
regional and internal players to achieve a common objective in Syria only intensified the 
regional and international conflict. Not a single player -whether supporting Assad or the 
opposition- is willing to compromise its interests in order to end the conflict.  
 Without a doubt, the Syrian conflict consists of many aspects that shaped its 
trajectory. First of all, it was the uprisings of the youth and rural suburbs rejecting the crony 
capitalism of the regime. Second of all, it was the ancient enmity between the Ba’ath ruling 
party and the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. Third, it is the geopolitics of the region and 
the realist balance of power game pursued by sectarian means to achieve different interests. 
Finally, it is the international powers’ interests projected in the region through the Syrian 
conflict (Salloukh 2013). 
  In conclusion, without sincere commitments from regional and international 
players to end the conflict, fragmentation will be the main trajectory drawing the upcoming 
years in Syria. Without the dedication of all conflicting parties to stop the war, atrocities 
will continue. Sectarian polarization and fragmentation will increase the Syrian conflict 
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spillover through the region. Without the limitation of all causes listed above, any political 
settlement seems unfeasible.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
5.1-Conclusion 
 The main aim of this thesis was to explore and identify the possible causes of the 
Syrian conflict.  The Syrian conflict metamorphosed from peaceful protests claiming 
freedom and democracy, into a civil war that tore the country apart. The level of regional 
and international intervention in Syria was unprecedented. Moreover, the conflict caused 
massive damage to Syria’s infrastructure where whole cities were destroyed and atrocities 
were committed. The level of violence kept escalating until Syria was classified as the 
world’s largest humanitarian crisis since World War 2.  
 Many reasons caused the emergence and the complexity of the Syrian conflict. In 
other words, the Syrian conflict is a multi-layered conflict where both domestic and 
regional triggers intensified the situation. First of all, the economic strategies pursued by 
Bashar Al-Assad neglected the middle and the poor proportion of the population.  These 
reforms created the emergence of crony capitalism in Syria which affected a major 
proportion of the population. People suffered from unfair equality and distribution. On the 
other hand. Proper economic liberalization could not be achieved without proper and 
adequate infrastructure to accommodate such a transformation. In other words, corruption 
and clientelism were deeply rooted in the Syrian regime Therefore, at the most basic level 
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of the conflict, it was the uprising of the youth and neglected people against the crony 
capitalist system of Assad and his patronage system.  
 Second of all, although Syria is a multi-ethnic homogenous society, sectarianism 
was a prominent feature causing the escalation of the events in Syria. At the beginning, 
people did not revolt on the basis of sectarian grievances but due to the increased regime 
brutality and the malfunctioning of the Syrian state to accommodate and provide the most 
basic people’s needs; people resorted to their sectarian/tribal affiliation to fill this gap. On 
the other hand, sectarianism was fueled in Syria by regional players as an instrument to 
achieve their means and rally support around them. Thus, sectarianism was not a mean 
rather it was a tool to achieve domestic and regional means.  
 Third of all, the lack of proper institutional infrastructure affordable to the middle 
and lower classes in Syria as well as the higher rates of unemployment, intensified people’s 
grievances against the regime. As a result, corruption emerged as a substitute to the 
government’s inability to provide the basic needs of the people. On the other hand, the 
increased role of religion in Syria was the substitute to the government’s insufficiency. To 
sum up, these domestic factors were the most basic triggers that ignited the conflict in 
Syria.  
 Although domestic factors were essential to the emergence of the conflict in Syria, 
they are not sufficient to explain the escalation and complexity of the Syrian conflict. Due 
to the inability of neither the regime nor the opposition to flip the situation, external help 
and support were vital to their survival. While the regime was mainly supported by Iran, 
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Russia and Hezbollah, the opposition was supported by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and 
the United States.  
 Both Iran and Saudi Arabia’s main aim was to assure their dominance in the region. 
The geopolitics of the region best explains the rivalry between the Shiite Iran and the Sunni 
Saudi Arabia. Their sectarian affiliations and aspirations cannot merely explain their 
motives in the region and especially regarding Syria; it was their interests pursued by 
sectarian means. Due to the weakness of the Syrian state and the domestic insurgencies 
occurring in Syria, the conflict created a vacuum that attracted the geopolitical contest to 
Syrian territory. While Saudi Arabia used the conflict in Syria to assure its geopolitical 
calculations as a fair compensation provided to control post Assad Sunni Syria. Iran, on 
the hand, recognized that the destruction of the Syrian regime will eventually lead to 
constraining the Iranian influence in the region and the demolishment of the axis of 
resistance. Iran was not willing to compromise its interests in the region and especially 
with its most important ally in the region “the Syrian regime”. It was all a matter of 
geopolitical balance of power pursued by two realist players.  
To summarize, the regime’s sectarianized apparatus and the collapse of the state’s 
power had facilitated the involvement of geopolitical actors in the Syrian conflict. Indeed, 
these conflicts such as the Syrian one is a fertile ground to be developed, fueled and 
sustained by outside powers.  
Chart.1- Causes of the Syrian Conflict 
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 Consequently, Russia and the United States’ proxy war is revisited in Syria. Russia, 
the main supporter of Assad’s regime, has multi-layered interests in Syria including the 
elimination of any threats emerging from political Islam, ensuring Russia’s role as a key 
player at the international scene and pursuing and preserving Russia’s geostrategic and 
economic interests in the region. On the other hand, the United States major interests in the 
region are to counter the Russian and Iranian influence in the region, ensuring the security 
of Israel, securing its national security through eliminating the threats emerging from 
terrorists groups in Syria and preserving its economic and strategic interests in the region 
represented by its regional allies. 
  .           
    
  
  
  
  
  
  Socio - Economics   
  
   
  
Sectarianism    
Institutional Insufficiency   
Regional Geopolitics   
International Powers Intervention    
Complex situation  
  
S oci o - E conomics   
74 
 
 To summarize, domestic grievances accompanied by economical faults, corruption, 
dictatorship and the sectarian sentiment of the regime along with the geopolitical realm of 
the region represented by the two camps -Saudi Arabia and Iran-and a proxy war between 
the two pillars of the world -Russia and the United States- are the causes that ignited and 
complicated the Syrian conflict. 
 Along with the rising role of communitarianism in the region and in Syria 
specifically, this thesis assessed the possibility of applying a power sharing formula as an 
attempt to end the conflict and start the process of state reconciliation. The approach used 
in this thesis was based on a comparison between Syria and Lebanon as a two neighboring 
states facing a civil war. After taking into consideration several similarities and differences, 
the study revealed that consociational democracy model that was applied in Lebanon is not 
sufficient nor effective as an exit strategy for the Syrian conflict. First of all, the Sunni 
majority in Syria which consists almost 75% of the population would have a negative 
impact on the efficiency of fair representation. Second, this Sunni majority does not 
coincide with its sub-groups neither ideologically nor religiously. Third, the conflict in 
Syria was not shaped as a sectarian conflict aiming to topple down the coalition of 
minorities, but sectarianism was a tool to achieve common ends.  
Consequently, Syria does not match the prerequisites demanded to establish a 
successful model according to Lijphart. The Syrian society is a multi-ethnic society 
whereas the Ba’ath dominated ideology was focusing on the Syrian national identity 
despite any other identities. An entire generation was raised and convinced with this 
ideology and any attempt to divide the Syrian community according to ethnicity or sect 
would only intensify the fragmentation that already exist due to the conflict. Consequently, 
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with the absence of an elite cartel to rule and dominate the minorities in Syria, insurgencies 
would absolutely occur and no one will be able to accommodate them.  
 Thus, a consociational democracy model that has not proven its efficiency in 
Lebanon which already had the prerequisites for a successful model, would not be the 
optimal solution regarding Syria which does not have these prerequisites nor the already 
divided social fabric. Accordingly, even though consociational democracy might be the 
optimal solution regarding the Syrian conflict, it could be applied as a result of the regional 
and international players’ agreement.  
 Consequently, this thesis provided the various attempts pursuing an end to the 
conflict in Syria. Several negotiations were held in Geneva and Vienna as an attempt to 
gather the conflicting parties and draw common remarks defining mutual points of 
interests. Unfortunately, none of these negotiations has proven to be sufficient to end the 
conflict. The inability of the conflicting parties to agree on mutual mode of governance 
hindered any attempt to apply the peace talks (Koudmani, 2015). Furthermore, the 
fragmentation of the opposition and the stubbornness of the regime decreased the tendency 
to achieve a political settlement. On the other hand, the rise of extremist groups such as 
ISIS triggered the national security of each country involved in the conflict. The expanding 
ideology of extremism and radical Islam has become among the top priorities to be 
eliminated according to the countries involved.   
 The different conflict mitigation processes regarding Syria have failed the key 
element regarding their failure was the fate of Assad. While the government’s 
representatives were not willing to negotiate any deal before the agreement on the need to 
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fight terrorism, the opposition representatives were not willing to negotiate any settlement 
that stipulates Assad’s future in power. Even though the conflicting parties had a vital point 
of difference, Staffan De Mistura announced that Assad must be a part of the solution 
(Koudmani, 2015). Indeed, after the emergence of terrorist groups in Syria, the world’s 
priority became the elimination of these groups rather than ousting Assad. Even though the 
United States and its regional allies want nothing more than to oust Assad, they would not 
take the chance for extremists to take over power. The level of involvement of regional and 
international powers in Syria makes the situation even more immune to any political 
settlement that compromises their interests in the region. Although the conflict in Syria 
began as Syrians claiming freedom, the future of Syria is not in Syrian hands anymore. 
5.2-Recommendations 
 As the Syrian conflict proceeds, the emerging threat is looming over the whole 
region and the world. The Syrian spillover on neighboring countries is tremendous. 
Consequently, the increasing numbers of refugees in European countries raises the red flag 
for the safety of these countries. On the other hand, the fragmentation of the opposition and 
the lack of adequate representation of the Syrian people among the opposition, raises the 
question of the availability of an adequate replacement of Assad. Consequently, the 
overthrow of Assad and what consequences it might have on the army might complicate 
the situation even more especially with the rise of ISIS.  Thus, with time passing by, the 
need for a political settlement in Syria increases. The catastrophe that the Syrians endured 
was unprecedented; the economic deterioration of the Syrian economy triggers the alarm 
of how long the Syrian state can survive; the rising role of extremists needs a rapid solution 
in order to eliminate the danger emerging in the whole world.  
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 Thus, the possibility of achieving a common political settlement in Syria depends 
on two main pillars. First of all, the ability of major powers involved in Syria to 
compromise its interests and agree on a common aim which is to end the Syrian conflict. 
As a result to their agreement, these powers would affect the situation on the ground by 
cutting their proxies and decreasing the level of violence. The second pillar is the military 
balance of powers on the field.  The Syrian army or the moderate rebels should acquire the 
privilege over the terrorists groups such as Al-Nussra Front and ISIS. 
 Any political settlement in Syria should contain the establishment of a transitional 
government consisted of representatives from both the regime and the opposition. On the 
other hand, the role of the military should be one of the priorities concerning this 
transitional government. It should be defined that the role of the military and the security 
apparatus is to control the country and fight any terrorists’ attacks guaranteeing the safety 
of the people as a whole. After the establishment of a transitional government and the 
assessment on the role of military and security apparatus in Syria, all foreign forces must 
withdrawal. The existence of any external forces could only intensify the situation and 
break the ceasefire. After the withdrawal of these foreign forces, political settlement and 
negotiations might have a chance to prosper.  
 Different approaches have been applied as an attempt to end the conflict in Syria 
including the conduction of fair elections supervised by international actors, the 
establishment of a new constitution and new governing options such as decentralization or 
federalization. None of these options were applied due to the ongoing military 
confrontation and the role of foreign forces. Indeed, the efficiency of these options was not 
tested due to the limitation of the study and the ongoing conflict that has not ended yet.  
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 One aspect of the post-conflict Syria that should always be a priority is the 
establishment of a proper state reconciliation process that could mitigate the consequences 
of the conflict and provide the basic elements for Syrians to reintegrate in the new Syria. 
The challenge of the peace process is certainly vital, but every war has to end. 
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